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Charles W. Sorenson, Jr.*
The Integrated Bar and the
Freedom of Nonassociation-
Continuing Seige
I. INTRODUCTION
The controversy surrounding the propriety, efficacy, and consti-
tutionality of the integrated bar association has been raging for al-
most seventy years.' Much of the controversy and a substantial
basis for a constitutional challenge to the integrated bar was sup-
posedly eliminated over twenty years ago in Lathrop v. Donohue.
2
In Lathrop, seven members of the United States Supreme Court
agreed that a state may require an attorney to pay reasonable an-
nual dues to an integrated bar association in order to practice law
within a state without infringing on that attorney's freedom of asso-
ciation.3 Lathrop has been interpreted as also supporting the prop-
osition that a state supreme court may integrate its bar association
by court order.4 However, it has been widely recognized that Lath-
rop did not decide whether an attorney can be forced to provide
financial support for integrated bar political activities with which
that attorney disagrees.5
* Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division; B-A. 1972, Uni-
versity of Colorado; M.A. 1977, University of California-Riverside; J.D. 1981,
University of Nebraska. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the
author.
1. The integrated bar, also referred to in some states as the unified, organized,
state, or incorporated bar, can be broadly defined as an official state organiza-
tion to which all attorneys must belong and pay dues as a precondition to the
practice of law within a state. See In re Unification of New Hampshire Bar, 248
A.2d 709, 711 (N.H. 1968); D. MCKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 22 (1963); Com-
ment, The Integrated Bar Association, 30 FoRDuAM L. REV. 477 (1962). At the
present time thirty-one states have bar associations which have been at least
partially integrated either by court rule, legislative act, or a combination of the
two. Winter, Challenged on Lobbying, Bars Mull Dues Rebates, 68 A.B.A. J.
1550 (1982).
2. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
3. Id. at 843.
4. D. McKEAN, supra note 1, at 85.
5. See 367 U.S. at 870 (Black, J., dissenting); D. McKEAN, supra note 1, at 84-111;
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, 134 Comment, Freedom
From Political Association: The Street and Lathrop Decisions, 56 Nw. U.L.
REv. 777, 786 (1962); Comment, The Integrated Bar After Lathrop v. Donohue-
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Despite Lathrop, attacks on the integrated bar based on statu-
tory and other constitutional grounds have continued.6 Recently
the controversy has intensified, and challenges to the integrated
bar have been brought with renewed fervor.7 Although the under-
lying cause of recent rebellions against the integrated bar-argua-
bly the inherent repulsiveness of any type of regimentation or
forced association-is probably the same as that which sparked
early resistance to bar unification,8 recent challenges have been
spurred by what many lawyers see as "runaway" mandatory dues
and bar association activities.9
In 1978, 400 members of the Wisconsin State Bar who opposed
bar association policies and activities attempted to institute a refer-
endum whereby members would be able to vote to return to a vol-
untary state bar association.10 After this attempt failed, some of
Integration or Disintegration, 11 CATH. U.L. REV. 85, 94 (1962); Recent Devel-
opments, Constitutionality of Required Payment of Dues to Integrated Bar As-
sociation, 23 Omo ST. L.J. 549, 551 (1962).
6. See, e.g., Swanson v. Florida Bar, 381 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1967) (challenge to
Florida Supreme Court integration rule did not present a substantial federal
constitutional question); Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969) (court
rejected several constitutional challenges to act and court rules establishing
unified bar, including arguments that it created an unlawful tax, deprived an
attorney of due process, violated separation of powers, and deprived an attor-
ney of free speech); Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718 (1969)
(court held that supreme court rule integrating the state bar was not an un-
constitutional exercise of unlawfully delegated legislative power under Geor-
gia Constitution, but rather an exercise of inherent judicial power); Ford v.
Board of Tax-Roll Corrections, 431 P.2d 423 (Okla. 1967) (court rejected chal-
lenge to integrated bar's tax exemption and held that court's action integrat-
ing the State Bar was exercise of police power vested in court); Button v. Day,
204 Va. 547, 132 S.E.2d 292 (1963) (court upheld state bar's ability to participate
in continuing legal education, to publish Bar news, and to hire counsel to pros-
ecute unauthorized practice suits); State ex rel. Schwab v. Washington State
Bar Ass'n, 80 Wash. 2d 266, 493 P.2d 1237 (1972) (court upheld state constitu-
tional challenge to authority of the state bar association to discipline attorney
who failed to pay dues on the grounds that the court is constitutionally au-
thorized to delegate such authority); Axel v. State Bar of Wis., 21 Wis. 2d 661,
124 N.W.2d 671 (1963) (court rejected challenge to legality of publication of
lawyer poll by bar association concerning qualifications of a particular judge).
7. See Pike, Reformers Challenge State Bars, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 5, 1981, at 1, col. 4;
Smith, Shootout at the Unified Bars, B. LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1978, at 117;
Woytash, Unified Bars are Under Siege, B. LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 33;
What's Happening, Will the California Bar Go the Way of Camelot? B.
LEADER, May-June, 1979, at 4; 68 A.B-A. J. 1550 (1981).
8. See, e.g., In re President of Mont. Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523, 525, 518 P.2d 32, 33
(1974); D. McKEAN, supra note 1, at 25-29; Vogl, Why Lawyers Should Oppose
Bar Integration, 20 DIcTA 63, 67 (1943).
9. Pike, supra note 7, at 1, coL 4; see also Smith, supra note 7, at 111; Woytash,
supra note 7, at 33; What's Happening, supra note 7, at 4.
10. See Armstrong v. Board of Governors of State Bar, 86 Wis. 2d 746, 273 N.W.2d
356 (1979).
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the same attorneys filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin to change the integrated bar to a voluntary bar association."
The petitioners argued that a poll of the active members of the bar
indicated widespread opposition to the integrated bar, that the orig-
inal reasons for integrating the bar, i.e., supervise admission, pro-
mote continuing competency, and enforce discipline, were no
longer extant because these functions were being performed by
other independent state boards, and that the state bar was engaged
in political and legislative activities of which the petitioners did not
approve.12 The Wisconsin Supreme Court found their arguments
unpersuasive.13
In 1980, however, the members of the unified bar of the District
of Columbia, through referendum, successfully placed a $75 per
year ceiling on mandatory bar dues and limited the activities to
which the unified bar could apply the fees to the "admission of at-
torneys; their continued registration; discipline of attorneys; and
[the] client security fund."14 Furthermore, the members limited
the activities to which voluntary contributions could be applied by
the association to lawyer referral services, publications, continuing
legal education, and certain bar committees. The District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals, which has the final word on bar matters, up-
held the limits placed upon the bar association.15
In light of the lack of success that critics have had in attacking
the integrated bar in the courts over the past thirty years, the ques-
tion arises as to whether there are any grounds upon which a suc-
cessful constitutional challenge might be made to integrated bar
association activities and compulsory dues. A number of attorneys
and commentators believe that Abood v. Detroit Board of Educa-
tion 16 fils the gap left by Lathrop,17 and creates the foundation for
a successful attack, based on the first amendment right of nonas-
sociation, on the use of compulsory bar dues for many bar associa-
tion activities.18  In Abood, the Supreme Court upheld the
11. In re Discontinuation of State Bar, 93 Wis. 2d 385, 286 N.W.2d 601 (1980).
12. Id. at 386-87, 286 N.W.2d at 602.
13. The Wisconsin Supreme Court is currently considering a bar review commit-
tee recommendation that dissident bar members be given a refund of the por-
tion of their mandatory dues which is used to support bar lobbying activities
with which the members disagree. Winter, supra note 1, at 1550.
14. District of Columbia Bar, Press Release (Dec. 18, 1980), reported in 5 NAT'L
CENTER FOR PROF. REsP. ADv. SH. 16 (1981). For a more detailed discussion of
the District of Columbia referendum, see Pike, supra note 7, passim.
15. See Winter, Does D.C. Revolt Bode llfor Unified Bars?, 67 A.B.A. J. 830 (1981).
16. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
17. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text; infra section MI of text.
18. See, e.g., Gonser, The State Bar Foundation: A Modern Renaissance, 64 A.B.A_
J. 1886, 1887 (1978); Pike, supra note 7, at 8, col. 2; Reynolds, Compulsory Bar
Dues in Montana: Two (And A Half) Challenges, 39 MONT. L REV. 268, 287
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constitutionality of an agency shop agreement for public school
teachers under which all employees were required to pay a service
fee to the union as a condition of continued employment.19 How-
ever, the Court also established that under the first amendment,
union expenditures of these fees "for the expression of political
views, on behalf of political candidates or towards the advancement
of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective
bargaining representative" must be "financed from charges, dues,
or assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing
those ideas. 2 0
Despite the fact that it has been assumed, almost tacitly, that
Abood applies analogously to the integrated bar,2 1 and the fact that
the unconstitutionality of integrated bar expenditures on political
or ideological activities against the wishes of a member has been
raised several times in the past,22 the applicability of the principles
and holding of Abood to the integrated bar remains an open ques-
tion which only recently has been addressed by the courts.23 The
(1978); Woytash, supra note 7, passim; Note, Falk v. State Bar of Michigan:
First Amendment Challenge to Bar Expenditures, 3 DET. C.L REV. 737, 744
(1982).
19. 431 U.S. at 211. See infra section IM, for a discussion of Abood.
20. 431 U.S. at 235-36.
21. See, e.g., A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIY 113 (Supp.
1979).
22. Integrated bar social, legislative, and political activities with which attorneys
have not agreed have been involved in recent cases that seem to have ignored
Abood. See Palmer v. Jackson, 617 F.2d 424, 425-30 (5th Cir. 1980) (the court,
without reference to Abood, used abstention to avoid determining plaintiff's
challenge to the Texas integrated bar activities based on first amendment
freedom of association); In re Discontinuation of State Bar, 93 Wis. 2d 385, 286
N.W.2d 601 (1980); Armstrong v. Board of Governors of State Bar, 86 Wis. 2d
746, 273 N.W.2d 356 (1979). Several pre-Abood cases have raised questions
concerning political activities by integrated bar associations to which mem-
bers objected. See Bridegroom v. State Bar, 27 Ariz. App. 47, 550 P.2d 1089
(1976) (court upheld expenditures by state bar association in support of a bal-
lot proposition); Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 505, 169 S.E.2d 790, 799 (1969) (court
found that expenditures by bar to support political issues and candidates was
not within purposes of bar integration act); Axel v. State Bar of Wisconsin, 21
Wis. 2d 661, 667-68, 124 N.W.2d 671, 675 (1963) (court upheld propriety of polling
bar members and disclosing the results of poll concerning qualifications of a
nominee for a federal judgeship).
23. See Arrow v. Dow, 636 F.2d 287, 289 (10th Cir. 1981), on remand, 544 F. Supp.
458, 460 (D.N.M. 1982) (the court held that the bar could not use mandatory
fees for certain lobbying efforts over members' objections); Schneider v.
Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 546 F. Supp. 1251, 1260-62 (D.P.R. 1982)
(challenge to use of mandatory bar membership fees for ideological purposes
states constitutional cause of action), modified sub nom. In re Justices of
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1982). See also Falk v.
State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich. 63, 305 N.W.2d 201 (Mich. 1981) (suit by a
Michigan lawyer to limit the Michigan Bar Association's activities to disci-
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purpose of this article is: (1) to analyze the question of whether the
first amendment right to freedom of nonassociation recognized in
Abood applies to activities of integrated bar associations; (2) to at-
tempt to determine the effect such an application would have on
specific bar association activities such as lobbying, publications,
and social activities; and (3) to analyze the effect that the extension
of the principles of Abood would have on the integrated bar in gen-
eral. The article will conclude that once unified bar associations
are limited to only those activities allowed under the principles of
Abood they may cease to exist. Before the constitutional and prac-
tical issues engendered by Abood and Lathrop are addressed, how-
ever, this article will first review briefly the history of the integrated
bar.24
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Debate over Integration
Herbert Harley, founder of the American Judicature Society, is
considered to have officially initiated the bar integration movement
in the United States with a speech he delivered to the Lancaster
County Bar Association in Lincoln, Nebraska, on December 28,
1914.25 Starting with the premise that a lawyer's "duty to himself
and to his family, his duty to make tongue and buckle meet, is para.,
mount and not at variance with his public duty with respect to the
administration of justice,"26 Harley asserted that the voluntary bar
association "is entirely inadequate to the needs of the lawyer from
either the standpoint of self-interest or from the standpoint of pub-
lic service."27 He believed that bar associations should serve the
following purposes: "the reasonable need for social intercourse,"
political influence by the bar in "statecraft," and "the need for edu-
pline and education based on a freedom of association argument from Abood
which has been pending since 1977). Compare Pike, supra note 7, at 8, col. 2
with Woytash, supra note 7, passim.
24. For additional discussion of the history of the integrated bar, see J. HURST,
THE GRowTH OF AMERICAN LAW 291 (1950); D. McKEAN, supra note 1, passim;
J. PARNESS, CITATION AND BIBIOGRAPHY ON THE UNIFIED BAR IN THE UNITED
STATES (1973); "Comment, supra note 5, at 85. For a discussion of the integra-
tion of the Nebraska Bar Association by court rule, see Kalish, The Nebraska
Supreme Court, the Practice of Law and the Regulation of Attorneys, 59 NEB.
L. REv. 555 (1979); J. Quinlan, An Historical View of Integration of the Ne-
braska State Bar Association (Apr. 6, 1976) (unpublished paper on fie with
the author).
25. See D. McKEAN, supra note 1, at 30-37; J. PARNEss, supra note 24, at 3; Kalish,
supra note 24, at 587 n.120. For the text of Harley's speech see Harley, A Law-
yer's Trust, 29 Jun. 50 (1945).
26. Harley, supra note 25, at 50.
27. Id. at 51.
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cation of the bar, for its proper discipline, and for the conduct of its
business."28 His suggested course for the full achievement of these
goals was bar integration--'welding all the lawyers of a state into
one closely knit organization." 29
The bar integration movement did not enjoy immediate suc-
cess.30 The first state to integrate, North Dakota, did so by statute
in 1921.31 Integration next occurred in Alabama in 1923 and Idaho
in 1925.32 By 1940 twenty states had adopted integrated bar associa-
tions by either statute or court rule.33 Perhaps because of the rela-
tive ease with which integration could be achieved by court order in
comparison to integration by statute, where lobbying resistance
was encountered,34 the use of legislation to integrate all but ceased
after 1939.35 By 1973 another nine states had joined the integration
movement,36 and by 1982 a total of thirty-one states had integrated
bar associations. 37
When one examines the extensive literature concerning the bar
integration movement, there is a tendency to conclude that all but a
few "die-hard" individuals were in favor of bar unification.38 How-
ever, the coverage of the pro-integration and the anti-integration ar-
guments in periodicals cannot be considered balanced. Articles
published during the days of the heaviest bar unification pressure,
purportedly written objectively, often presented a pro-integration
perspective. 39 This state of the literature is not all that surprising
in light of the fact that the great majority of bar integration articles
appeared in voluntary bar association journals. It was these volun-
tary bar associations which had the most to gain from unification of
the bar, by bolstering memberships, finances, and influence, 40 and
28. Id. at 51-52.
29. Id. at 56.
30. For example, it took 22 years of effort and several failures before the Nebraska
bar was integrated. See Harley, Does $3 a Year Mean Regimentation, 13 FLA.
LJ. 41 (1939); see also Kalish, supra note 24, at 587 n.120.
31. J. PARNESS, supra note 24, at 3.
32. D. MCKEAN, supra note 1, at 44. Actually Idaho was first integrated in 1923 by
a statute that was held to be void. Id.
33. Harley, supra note 25, at 41.
34. D. MCKEAN, supra note 1, at 49.
35. See J. PARNESS, supra note 24, at 3-4.
36. Id.
37. It should be noted that there is substantial variability in the degree of integra-
tion. For example, some of the states which are recognized as having a unified
bar, e.g., Virginia, South Carolina, and West Virginia, limit their function to
admission and disciplinary matters. J. PARNEss, supra note 24, at 4.
38. See id. at 21-32.
39. See, e.g., Curtis, The Pros & Cons of an Integrated Bar, 12 LAw Soc'y J. 103
(1946-47); Wicker, Pros & Cons of an Integrated Bar, 23 TENN. I REV. 457 (1954-
55).
40. See Essery, Bar Integration, 19 JuD. 174, 176 (1936) (discussion of the weak-
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which were actively lobbying for bar integration. 41 It has been said
that "[u]p to 1950 the only thoroughgoing activity of the organized
profession with reference to its own housekeeping was the drive for
the 'integrated bar.' "42
The arguments made in favor of and in opposition to the inte-
grated bar have changed little over the past fifty years.43 Argu-
ments frequently made in support of the integrated bar based
primarily on the public interest have included, inter alia: (1) volun-
tary bar associations are ineffective in improving the competency,
standards, and image of the profession;44 (2) bar integration as-
sures effective discipline and enforcement of ethical standards;45
(3) improvements in the administration of justice will result from
bar integration;4 6 (4) the integrated bar can better protect the pub-
lic interest by monitoring legislation 47 and (5) judicial reform legis-
lation can be more effectively promoted by the integrated bar.48
Other arguments offered to support bar integration have primar-
ily addressed the interests of bar associations and lawyers, al-
though, arguably, the public interest might also be involved. These
arguments include: (1) the integration of the bar will increase
membership in the bar and will improve financial resources; 49
(2) better "participation, diversity of viewpoints, and quality of
work will result"; 0 (3) bar integration will lead to improved educa-
nesses of the voluntary bar); Grinnell, What to Do? 31 MASS. L.Q. 21 (1945)
(integration necessary to keep bar from weakening).
41. See, e.g., Kalish, supra note 24, at 587 n.120. Activities beyond simple lobbying
have been attributed to bar integration advocates. One integrated bar oppo-
nent charged that "integrators" waited until the majority of attorneys were
away at war before putting the pressure on and that there was evidence of
deceitful practices. See Vogl, supra note 8, at 64.
42. J. HURST, supra note 24, at 365.
43. Compare In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W.
265 (1937) and Essery, supra note 40 with In re President of Mont. Bar Ass'n,
163 Mont. 523, 518 P.2d 32 (1974); Nixon & Brown, Brief in Support of Unifica-
tion of New Hampshire Bar, 11 N.H. BARm J. 8 (1968); and Struckhoff, Comments
by a Member of the Bar in Opposition to Integration, 11 N.H.B. J. 39 (1968).
44. E.g., Nixon & Brown, supra note 43, at 26.
45. E.g., In re President of Montana Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523, 524, 518 P.2d 32, 33
(1974); In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 284, 275
N.W. 265, 267 (1937); Nixon & Brown, supra note 43, at 27; Comment, supra
note 1, at 481.
46. E.g., Nixon & Brown, supra note 43, at 28; Comment, supra note 1, at 482.
47. E.g., Essery, supra note 40, at 175; Nixon & Brown, supra note 43, at 34.
48. E.g., In re President of Montana Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523, 524, 518 P.2d 32, 33
(1974); Nixon & Brown, supra note 43, at 27.
49. E.g., Nixon & Brown, supra note 40, at 32; Hennessey, The Case for an Inte-
grated Bar, 50 MAss. L.Q. 10 (1964); Wicker, supra note 39, at 458.
50. In re President of Montana Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523, 524, 518 P.2d 32, 33 (1974);
J. PARNESS, supra note 24, at 3.
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tion;51 (4) membership in the integrated bar will be open to all
without regard to sex, race, or religion;52 (5) integration of the bar
will eliminate clique control common in voluntary bar associa-
tions; 53 (6) the public will view attorneys more positively under an
integrated bar system; 54 (7) bar integration will improve the eco-
nomic position of lawyers through the institution of minimum fee
schedules;55 (8) the integration of the bar will actually be beneficial
to local voluntary bar associations;56 (9) self-government and self-
discipline by the legal profession are promoted by bar unification;5 7
(10) the bar has many duties of public responsibility (e.g., client
security funds, making legal services available), and bar integra-
tion eliminates "freeloaders" in the profession, i.e., lawyers who do
not fulfill their public responsibilities; 58 (11) bar integration pro-
vides the mechanism by which lawyers can speak with one voice on
important public and social issues;59 and (12) the integrated bar
will protect lawyers by providing a mechanism to monitor legisla-
tion that may affect their professional interests. 60
A review of these pro-unification arguments reveals two inter-
esting and important points concerning the integration movement.
First, it would appear that historically the integration controversy,
at least from the proponents' perspective, was conceptualized as
one in which an integrated bar association or a voluntary bar asso-
ciation were the only alternatives. 6 1 The proponents of bar unifica-
tion did not seem to acknowledge or address the fact that the state
could accomplish the goals of regulating discipline, bar admission
51. E.g., Essery, supra note 40, at 174; Nixon & Brown, supra note 43, at 32.
52. E.g., J. PARNESS, supra note 24, at 3.
53. E.g., Nixon & Brown, supra note 43, at 27; Compulsory Membership in a Bar
Association, 34 JuD. 100, 101 (1950).
54. E.g., In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 284, 275 N.W.
265, 266 (1937); Nixon & Brown, supra note 43, at 32.
55. E.g., Nixon & Brown, supra note 43, at 34; see D. McKEAN, supra note 1, at 67.
56. E.g., In re President of Montana Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523, 524, 518 P.2d 33
(1974); Curtis, supra note 39, at 106.
57. E.g., Editorial, supra note 53, at 101.
58. E.g., In re President of Montana Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523, 524, 518 P.2d 32, 33
(1974); Curtis, supra note 39, at 105; Hennessey, supra note 49, at 10.
59. E.g., Hennessey, supra note 49, at 9; Nixon & Brown, supra note 43, at 32, 34;
Comment, supra note 1, at 482.
60. E.g., Nixon & Brown, supra note 43, at 34; see also Curtis, supra note 39, at 106;
McMullin, In Behalf of a Unified State Bar, 13 DICTA 61, 65 (1936).
61. Perhaps somewhat illustrative of this attitude, as well as a dated attitude to-
ward women, is a comment in an editorial arguing why the integrated bar
should be adopted even if the voluntary bar association is thriving: "Any
housewife knows better than to take the second best head of lettuce when the
largest, firmest and freshest one in the pile is hers at the same price. Are
lawyers to show less intelligence, and refuse the best merely because they
have the second best?" Who Are the Opponents of Bar Integration? 26 Jun. 112
(1942).
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requirements, ethical standards, and lawyer registration, through
statute or court rule without integrating an existing bar associa-
tion.62 The second point that emerges is that the majority of rea-
sons offered for integrating the bar would benefit primarily lawyers
and bar associations. 63 Furthermore, many of the reasons offered
to support unification of the bar have become publicly unaccept-
able. For example, the use of the integrated bar to fix minimum
fees that will improve the legal profession's economic position, al-
though probably legal,64 would undoubtedly prove publicly embar-
rassing. Similarly, the use of bar integration to increase the general
lobbying effectiveness of the legal profession has not only been
heavily criticized over the years,65 but has also been subjected to
legal challenge based on a lack of service to the public interest 66
and constitutional challenge based on freedom of association.67
These points are important to keep in mind when considering the
continuing viability of the integrated bar.6 8
Because publicly the proponents of bar unification usually
couched their arguments in terms of better serving the public inter-
est,69 opponents found themselves in a rather awkward position.
Their obvious response was to argue that the integration of a bar
association was not necessary either because (1) the voluntary as-
sociation could adequately serve the public interest in integrity and
quality of the profession, or (2) there was an alternative to bar uni-
fication in the form of state regulation. The problem was that the
first contention was not very believable7 0 and that the second was
62. See, e.g., Ables v. Fones, 587 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1978); Hagopian v. Justices of
Supreme Judicial Court, 429 F. Supp. 267 (D. Mass. 1977); Board of Overseers
of Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998 (Me. 1980); In re Tenn. Bar Ass'n, 532 S.W.2d 224
(Tenn. 1975). But see Haberman, A State Bar Before & After Unification, 50
MASS. L.Q. 247, 257 (1965) (Haberman in a speech warns lawyers that the al-
ternative to integration is regulation by the state.)
63. See J. STONE, LEGAL EDUCATION & PUBLIC RESPONsIBnnrY 229 (1959).
64. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 359 (1977). But see Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975).
65. See, e.g., D. McKEAN, supra note 1, at 52-83. But see Katz, What is the State
Bar-A Platypus?, 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 432, 433 (1977).
66. See, e.g., In re Discontinuation of Wisconsin State Bar, 93 Wis. 2d 385, 386, 286
N.W.2d 601, 602 (1980); Armstrong v. Board of Governors of State Bar, 86 Wis.
2d 746, 747, 273 N.W.2d 356, 358 (1979).
67. See infra section I1-C of text.
68. See infra section IV of text.
69. Better ethical standards, disciplinary procedures, administration of justice,
and legal reform were justifications commonly cited by courts as they ordered
integration. See, e.g., In re Integration of the Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133
Neb. 283, 284, 275 N.W. 365, 365 (1937); In re President of Montana Bar Ass'n,
163 Mont. 523, 524, 518 P.2d 32, 33 (1974).
70. See J. HURsT, supra note 24, at 364-66.
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quite unpopular among lawyers 71 and could clearly be viewed as
contrary to the self-interest of the legal profession. Thus, although
both arguments were made, 72 opponents of bar unification more
frequently put forth arguments grounded in law or individualism or
attacked supporters of integration as being motivated by self-inter-
est. It was asserted that: (1) compulsory membership in the bar
deprived attorneys of the fundamental liberty of freedom of
choice;73 (2) integration was the equivalent of regimentation;7 4
(3) integration of the bar increased bureaucracy and the tax bur-
den;7 5 (4) bar integration deprived attorneys of property without
due process and imposed a form of involuntary servitude;7 6 (5) free
speech rights were infringed under the integrated bar;77 (6) the in-
tegrated bar was like a "closed shop";78 (7) bar integration could
cause obsequiousness on the part of attorneys in the face of judicial
control;79 (8) integration was motivated by economic self-interest
and guildism;8o (9) integration gave state power to a private inter-
est group which advocated legal reform carrying broad social impli-
cations;81 (10) even if the integrated bar was limited to lobbying
activities related to the administration of justice, it was often im-
possible to distinguish administration of justice from broad public
policy;82 (11) the integrated bar was not responsive to captive mem-
bers' desires and needs; 83 (12) excessive influence by specialized
minority interests or a power clique would result from bar integra-
tion;84 (13) compulsion would not cure attorney apathy;85 and
(14) bar integration would cause rigidity in the legal profession.86
The results of the debate between pro-integrationists and anti-
71. See, e.g., VogL, supra note 8, at 66-67; Haberman, supra note 62, at 257.
72. E.g., In re President of Montana Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523, 524, 518 P.2d 32, 33
(1974); Struckhoff, supra note 40, at 43, 45; Vogl, supra note 8, at 64, Comment,
supra note 1, at 483.
73. In re President of Montana Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523, 524, 518 P.2d 32, 33;
Struckhoff, supra note 43, at 46.
74. E.g., Hannigan, supra note 8, at 18; Vogl, supra note 8, at 67; see Struckhoff,
supra note 43, at 45.
75. Vogl, supra note 8, at 64.
76. E.g., In re President of Montana Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523, 525, 518 P.2d 32, 33;
Comment, supra note 1, at 482.
77. E.g., J. PARNESS, supra note 24, at 3; Comment, supra note 5, at 89.
78. E.g., Wicker, supra note 39, at 460; Vogl, supra note 8, at 66.
79. See D. McK;AN, supra note 1, at 131.
80. E.g., Struckhoff, supra note 43, at 39, 46.
81. Id. at 50.
82. Id. at 50-51.
83. E.g., Wait, The Case Against the Bar "Once More into the Breach .. ", 50
MAss. L.Q. 13, 17 (1965). See Comment, supra note 5, at 89.
84. E.g., Struckhoff, supra note 43, at 48.
85. Struckhoff, supra note 43, at 44.
86. Id. at 39, 51.
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integrationists perhaps bears witness to the truth of DeToqueville's
statement that lawyers, "like most other men, are governed by their
private interests of the moment."87 Arguably, thirty-one states
adopted integrated bar associations between 1921 and 1978 only be-
cause the legal profession and bar associations believed they were
gaining more than they were losing by integrating.88 During this
time, nonetheless, the integrated bar also faired well against chal-
lengers in the courts.89 Lathrop v. Donohue,90 decided in 1961, is
undoubtedly the most important case in which the constitutionality
of the integrated bar was directly at issue. However, two other
Supreme Court cases, Railway Employees' Department v. Han-
son9 ' and International Association of Machinists v. Street,92 are of
assistance in gaining a proper understanding of Lathrop.
B. The Early Supreme Court Cases
1. Railway Employees' Department v. Hanson
As authorized by section two of the Railway Labor Act,93 labor
organizations of Union Pacific Railroad employees entered into a
union shop agreement with the company. The agreement provided
that all employees would be required to join the union within sixty
days of being hired and would have to maintain their membership
87. A. DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835) reprinted in D. MCKEAN,
supra note 1, at 112.
88. To a certain extent the legal profession's assessment may have depended on
the perceived reasonableness of the compulsory fees. Bar fees appeared to
have been relatively minimal at the time the integration movement was at its
zenith. For example, Herbert Harley, the father of bar unification, stated in
1939 that "[tJhe fee is insignificant, ranging from two dollars to seven-fifty.
The average is around five dollars." Harley supra note 25, at 41. This was
apparently still the case at the time of Lathrop in 1961, where the challenged
fee was only $15.00. 367 U.S. 820, 821 (plurality opinion). There is some evi-
dence that the revolt against the integrated bar today has been caused at least
partially by what are viewed as excessive fees. Pike, supra note 7, at 1, col. 4.
For example, the current cost of compulsory membership in the Nebraska
State Bar Association is $150.
89. See J. PARNESS, supra note 24, at 9. In 1973, Parness stated that "no case was
found to support any constitutional or non-constitutional attack on the valid-
ity of the bar." Id. Although this statement is not entirely accurate, see, e.g.,
Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969) (certain activities by the inte-
grated bar found to be ultra vires); In re Integration of the Bar, 249 Wis. 523, 25
N.W.2d 500 (1946) (rejecting bar integration), a review of the case law concern-
ing the integrated bar clearly demonstrates the overwhelming success of inte-
gration proponents. See supra notes 3-4 & 22 and accompanying text.
90. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
91. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
92. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
93. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C.
§ 152 (1976)).
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as a condition of employment.94 Nonunion employees of the rail-
road obtained an injunction against the enforcement of the agree-
ment. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that
the union shop agreement violated the employees' first amendment
rights because it required members to pay dues that were used to
obtain objectives unrelated to collective bargaining.95
The United States Supreme Court treated the case as one in-
volving primarily a question of the power of Congress to regulate
labor relations.96 Because the validity of the statutory provision
authorizing a union shop was characterized as "one of policy with
which the judiciary has no concern," 97 the-Court stated that it only
had to find that the provision was "relevant or appropriate to the
constitutional power which Congress exercises."98  The Court
noted the propriety of the asserted interests of industrial peace and
stable labor-management relations through collective bargaining
with the true representative of the employees, 99 and held that the
"requirement for financial support of the collective-bargaining
agency by all who receive the benefits ... does not violate the First
or the Fifth Amendments."' 00
Arguably, the Court's treatment of the first amendment claims
in Hanson linked the fate of the integrated bar to that of union
shops. After reviewing the arguments that a union shop agreement
"forces men into ideological and political associations which violate
their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and
freedom of thought. . ,.101 Justice Douglas, writing for a unani-
mous Court, stated:
On the present record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of
First Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by
state law is required to be a member of an integrated bar. It is argued that
compulsory membership will be used to impair freedom of expression. But
that problem is not presented by this record. Congress endeavored to safe-
guard against that possibility by making explicit that no conditions to any
membership may be imposed except as respects 'periodic dues, initiation
fees, and assessments.' If other conditions are in fact imposed, or if the
exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover for forc-
ing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First
Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice that case.1 0 2
94. 351 U.S. at 231 n.3.
95. Hanson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 160 Neb. 669, 700, 71 N.W.2d 526, 547 (1955).
96. 351 U.S. at 233.
97. Id. at 234.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 233.
100. Id. at 238.
101. Id. at 236.
102. Id. at 238. It must be noted that later, in Lathrop, Justice Douglas ironically
retracted his statement concerning the analogy with the integrated bar. See
367 U.S. 820, 879 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Hanson has been heavily criticized for the Court's failure to give
adequate weight in the reviewing process to fundamental first
amendment concerns.10 3 Commentators have noted that the defer-
ence to the legislative judgment in Hanson was indicative of a lack
of the strict scrutiny by the Court that would normally be expected
where legislation is challenged based on the first amendment. 0 4
Moreover, Hanson left unanswered questions concerning the use of
compulsory membership fees to support activities other than col-
lective bargaining. 0 5 Those questions were next addressed in an-
other Railway Labor Act case, International Association of
Machinists v. Street.0 6
2. International Association of Machinists v. Street
In Street, the Supreme Court was again faced with a constitu-
tional challenge to section two of the Railway Labor Act.107 In this
case, employees alleged that in order to hold their jobs under a
union shop agreement they were compelled to pay fees which were
used to a substantial extent to support "political and economic doc-
trines, concepts and ideologies with which they disagreed."'0 8 The
trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court held that this activity by
the union violated, inter alia, the employees' freedom of thought,
speech, and association, and entered a decree enjoining enforce-
ment of the union-shop agreement.109
The Supreme Court, on appeal, noted that Hanson held only
that section two of the Railway Labor Act was "constitutional in its
bare authorization of union-shop contracts requiring workers to
give 'financial support' to unions legally authorized to act as their
collective bargaining agents." The Court did not address any other
aspects of forced association or the issue of the use of dues for
103. See Bond, The National Labor Relations Act & the Forgotten First Amend-
ment, 28 S.C.L. REv. 421, 436 (1977); McClain, The Union Shop Amendment:
Compulsory "Freedom" to Join a Union, 42 A.B.A. J. 723 (1956); Note, The
"Right to Work" Individual or Collective Right?, 6 J. PUB. L. 263 (1957); Re-
cent Developments, Constitutionality of Required Payment of Dues to Inte-
grated Bar Association, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 549 (1963).
104. E.g., Bond, supra note 103, at 436.
105. See 351 U.S. at 238.
106. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
107. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C.
§ 152 (1976)).
108. 367 U.S. at 744. The trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court specifically
found that the union dues were being used to support political candidates for
office and to promote legislative programs that were not reasonably necessary
to collective bargaining. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 215 Ga. 27,
43-44, 108 S.E.2d 796, 808 (1959).
109. 367 U.S. at 746 n.3.
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political causes.1 1 0 Although the Court believed that the record in
Street squarely presented those constitutional issues, it avoided
deciding the constitutional questions by relying on the doctrine
that "when the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in ques-
tion, and even if serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a con-
struction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided."'
The Court was forced to read a great deal into the Railway Labor
Act in order to find anything within its provisions which even re-
motely addressed the issues before the Court.112 The Court rea-
soned that the Railway Labor Act union-shop provision had two
major purposes: (1) to help defray the expenses of the negotiation
or administration of collective agreements, or the expenses en-
tailed in the adjustment of grievances and disputes;" 3 and (2) to
protect dissenters' interests." 4 The use of an employee's money
over his objections:
to support candidates for public office, and advance political programs...
is a use which clearly falls outside the reasons advanced by the Unions and
accepted by Congress why authority to make union-shop agreements was
justified. On the other hand, it is equally clear that it is a use to support
activities within the area of dissenters' interests which Congress enaaced
the proviso to protect." 5
Therefore, the Court held that section two of the Railway Labor Act
denied "the unions, over an employee's objection, the power to use
his exacted funds to support political causes which he opposes."" 6
110. Id. at 749.
111. Id. at 749 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
112. Critics have suggested that the Court's analysis of the statute in Street was
artificial and incorrect. Justice Black forcefully argued that the Court had dis-
torted the statute in order to leave itself open later to decide that integrated
bar associations could compel financial support for activities with which the
members disagreed. See 367 U.S. at 785-86 (Black, J., dissenting). He dis-
sented on the grounds that the constitutional question concerning first
amendment rights should have been answered and that "the First Amend-
ment bars use of dues extorted from an employee by law for the promotion of
causes, doctrines, and laws that unions generally favor to help the unions, as
well as any other political purposes." Id. at 790-91. Justice Frankfurter, who
believed that the use of union dues to support political activities with which a
member did not agree was constitutional, also believed that there was no way
the Railway Labor Act could "untorturingly" be construed to bar the union
activities in question in Street. Id. at 800, 803. See Comment, The Right of
Ideological Nonassociation, 66 CALiF. L. REV. 767, 772 (1978).
113. 367 U.S. at 750-62.
114. See id. at 765-70.
115. Id. at 768.
116. Id. at 768-69. Once the Court found a violation of the Railway Labor Act, it
suggested two remedies that would protect both the interests of the majority
and those of the dissenters, both of which required employees to first affirma-
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It is important to note that the Court in Street specifically declined
to express any opinion on union expenditures objected to by em-
ployees that were not related to collective bargaining and were not
political."17
The question of the constitutionality, under the first amend-
ment, of the use of compulsory dues to support political causes
with which an employee disagrees remained unanswered after
Street. However, there was an opportunity to answer that question
in the context of the integrated bar in Lathrop v. Donohue,118 de-
cided the same day as Street.
3. Lathrop v. Donohue
To say that Lathrop has received mixed reviews by the com-
mentators is to be kind.119 Predictably, the pro-integrationists ac-
claimed the Supreme Court's decision as probably ranking "as its
greatest single contribution to the better administration of justice
since the coming of the Federal Rules in 1937."120 However, others
have not been so favorably disposed to the decision. Justice Black
began his dissenting opinion in Lathrop with the statement that "I
do not believe that either the bench, the bar or the litigants will
know what has been decided in this case-certainly I do not."'21
One commentator, while heavily criticizing the Lathrop opinion,
called it "an unusual exercise in judicial logrolling."122 Similarly,
the Court has been accused of dodging the constitutional issue that
tively make their objections known to union officials. One remedy was an
injunction against expenditures on political causes objected to by each dis-
senting employee equal to that amount of his compulsory dues "as is the pro-
portion of the union's total expenditures made for such activities to the
union's total budget." Id. at 775. This method would eliminate the tendency
of the union to shift funds from political use to non-political use, and visa
versa, without actually spending less on political causes. The second remedy
suggested by the Court was restitution based on a similar proportion. See id.
For a discussion of the inadequacies of these remedies, see The Supreme
Court, 1960 Term, supra note 5, at 237-39 (1961).
117. 367 U.S. at 769-70.
118. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
119. For additional discussion and analysis of Lathrop, see D. McKEAN, supra note
1, at 84-111; Bond, supra note 113, at 436-37; Comment, supra note 112, at 773;
Comment, supra note 5, at 90; Comment, supra note 1, at 477; Comment, supra
note 5, at 784-90; Supreme Court Upholds Integrated Bar, 45 JuD. 37 (1961);
Recent Developments, Constitutionality of Required Payment of Dues to Inte-
grated Bar Association, 23 OHio ST. L.J. 549 (1962).
120. A Major Victory for the Integrated Bar, 45 JuD. 46, 47 (1961).
121. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 865 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). At least
part of Justice Black's consternation was due to the fact that there was not
majority support for any of the five opinions fled. See id. at 866.
122. The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, supra note 5, at 134.
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was before it.123 Nevertheless, despite its inadequacies and faults,
Lathrop stands as the only Supreme Court decision directly ad-
dressing the constitutional issues surrounding the integrated
bar.124
Lathrop placed the same issues addressed in Hanson before the
Court in the context of a court ordered unification of a state bar
association. Lathrop, a Wisconsin attorney, challenged the consti-
tutionality of the Wisconsin integrated bar based on the first
amendment freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and petition that
are inherent in the fourteenth amendment. 25 Specifically, he ar-
gued that there was a freedom not to associate which was violated
when the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered the integration of the
bar and forced him to pay a $15 annual membership fee as a condi-
tion on his right to practice law.126 Lathrop also argued that his
first amendment rights were violated by the fact that the state bar
association used the dues money to support legislative causes
which he opposed.
Although the case was before the Wisconsin Supreme Court on
a demurrer, the court decided the constitutional issues on the mer-
its, judicially noticing the facts necessary to reach its decision. 2 7
The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the order integrating
the bar and continuing that integration did not violate the plaintiffs
right of association and that "his rights to free speech were not vio-
lated because the state bar used his membership dues to support
legislation with which he disagreed."128
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court Justice Brennan,
writing for the plurality, characterized Lathrop's central argument
as being that an individual "cannot constitutionally be compelled to
join and give support to an organization which has among its func-
tions the expression of opinion on legislative matters and which
utilizes its property, funds and employees for the purpose of influ-
encing legislation and public opinion toward legislation."'2 9 Con-
cluding that the argument was essentially one of freedom of
123. See Comment, supra note 112, at 773; Recent Developments, supra note 20, at
549, 551. But see Comment, supra note 5, at 94-95.
124. But see Buschbacher v. Supreme Court of Ohio, No. C-2-75-743, 75-309 (S.D.
Ohio 1976), ajf'd sub nom. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Supreme Court of
Ohio, 430 U.S. 901 (1977).
125. Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404 (1960).
126. See id. at 236, 102 N.W.2d at 407-08.
127. Id. at 234, 102 N.W.2d at 404. The facts primarily consisted of the activities of
the state bar, which the court characterized as administration of justice, court
reform, and legal practice. Id. The propriety and fairness of this procedure in
this case has been questioned. See D. McKEAN, supra note 1, at 48-49;
Supreme Court 1960 Term, supra note 5, at 135-36.
128. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at 823 (plurality opinion).
129. Id. at 827.
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association, the plurality, accepting the interpretation of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court, responded that Lathrop was not being
forced to associate with anyone and that the only compulsion he
was subjected to was the payment of the $15 annual dues. There-
fore, the plurality believed it was confronted with the same ques-
tion it faced in Hanson, i.e., "compelled financial support of group
activities, not with involuntary membership in any other aspect."130
Having analogized the case to Hanson, the plurality apparently
applied the same sort of broad analysis used in relation to a union
shop agreement to Lathrop's freedom of association rights.131 Jus-
tice Brennan first reviewed the purposes and activities of the state
bar132 and concluded that legislative or political activities clearly
were not the predominant activities of the state bar.133 The plural-
ity found that the Wisconsin court might reasonably conclude that
a majority of activities of the state bar improve educational and eth-
ical standards of the bar, resulting in improved quality of legal serv-
ices to the public. Justice Brennan stated that it could not "be
denied that this is a legitimate end of state policy"'134 and con-
cluded that the state may constitutionally impose the costs of this
purpose on the lawyers, who are the beneficiaries of bar integra-
tion, "even though the organization created to attain the objective
also engages in some legislative activity."135 In light of the pres-
ence of a legitimate public objective and the fact that membership
was limited to only the compulsory payment of "reasonable annual
dues," the Justices constituting the plurality were unwilling to find
an infringement of the plaintiff's rights of association.13 6
Justices Harlan, Frankfurter, and Whittaker concurred in the
judgment on this issue. Justice Whittaker did so on the grounds
that the practice of law was a "special privilege" and not a right
130. Id. at 828, 842.
131. See Comment, supra note 5, at 785.
132. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at 828-42. Among the purposes asserted for
the integrated bar were:
to aid . . . the administration of justice; to foster and maintain ...
high ideals of integrity, learning, competence and public service and
high standards of conduct; to safeguard the proper professional inter-
ests of the members of the bar; to encourage the formation and activi-
ties of local bar associations; to provide a forum for the discussion of
subjects pertaining to the practice of law, the science of jurisprudence
and law reform, and the relations of the bar to the public, and to pub-
lish information relating thereto; to the end that the public responsi-
bilities of the legal profession may be more effectively discharged.
Id. at 828-29 (citation omitted).
133. Id. at 839. Not all commentators would necessarily agree with this assess-
ment. See Comment, supra note 5, at 785 & n.49.
134. 367 U.S. at 843 (plurality opinion).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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under the constitution.137 Therefore, neither the compulsory dues
requirement nor the use of dues for political causes with which the
member disagrees was unconstitutional.138 Justice Harlan, joined
by Justice Frankfurter, simply stated that Hanson a fortiori "surely
lays at rest all doubt that a State may, Constitutionally condition
the right to practice law upon membership in an integrated bar as-
sociation, a condition fully as justified by state needs as the union
shop is by federal needs."139
Only Justice Douglas, despite the fact that he had written the
opinion for the Court in Hanson, 40 did not agree that the state
could compel lawyers to pay dues to the integrated bar association
as a condition of practicing law within a state.'41 In reversing his
previous position and reaching the conclusion that the integrated
bar violated Lathrop's first amendment freedom of association, Jus-
tice Douglas stated: "In the Hanson case we said, to be sure, that if
a lawyer could be required to join an integrated bar, an employee
could be compelled to join a union shop. But on reflection the anal-
ogy fails."'142
Justice Douglas, arguably applying a traditional first amend-
ment analysis,14 3 asserted that the state interests involved in Han-
son were of more importance than those involved in Lathrop.144
The interest served in Hanson was to eliminate "freeriders" who
137. Id. at 865 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
138. The soundness of Justice Whittaker's cryptic analysis is certainly questiona-
ble in light of two recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the legal pro-
fession and first amendment rights. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 457-62 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) for
cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized that the legal practitioner is
not without first amendment rights and that at least important state interests
must be asserted before infringing on those rights. See also Gordon v. Com-
mittee on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641
(1979) (court held six month attorney residency requirement unconstitutional
under the privileges and immunities clause); Note, The Constitutionality of
State Residency Requirementsfor Attorneys Under the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause: The Attack Continues, 61 NEB. L REV. 200 (1981).
139. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at 849 (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
140. See Railway Employees' Dep't. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (upheld union
shop agreements exacting membership fees as a condition of employment).
141. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at 877-85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 879.
143. See id. at 879-85; Bond, supra note 103, at 437.
144. See 367 U.S. at 879-82; Comment, supra note 5, at 787 & n.65. One commentator
has stated that Justice Douglas found that the state interest in Hanson, elimi-
nation of "freeriders," was compelling. Bond, supra note 103, at 437. It must
be noted, however, that at no point in his dissenting opinion did Justice Doug-
las employ this characterization, although his analysis would appear to be
quite analogous to a compelling state interest test. See infra note 144 and ac-
companying text.
1983]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
"may be so disruptive of labor relations and therefore so fraught
with danger to movement of commerce that Congress has the
power to permit a union-shop agreement. ... 145 In Justice Doug-
las' opinion, the integrated bar served primarily to discipline mem-
bers of the bar and promote legislation supported by the majority
of the members. Although the right not to associate with a group is
not absolute, Justice Douglas would have required exceptional cir-
cumstances before that right could be curtailed by narrowly drawn
laws. 46 For Justice Douglas, Hanson was "a narrow exception to
be closely confined" in order to avoid putting "professional people
into goosestepping brigades."147
The second issue discussed in Lathrop is most relevant to the
current controversy concerning the constitutionality of certain inte-
grated bar association activities. 4 8 Justice Brennan stated that the
issue raised in the state court was whether the use of Lathrop's
dues to support causes which he opposed violated his first amend-
ment rights.149 Justice Brennan noted that the Wisconsin court
had decided the question on the grounds that the right to practice
law is just a privilege which is subject to regulation that does "not
impose an unconstitutional burden or deny due process,' 5 0 and
that the public interest promoted by having "'public expression of
the views of a majority of the lawyers of the state, with respect to
legislation effecting the administration of justice and the practice of
law ... voiced through their own democratically chosen represent-
atives.., far outweighs the slight incbnvenience to the plaintiff re-
sulting from his required payment of the annual dues."'151
Without commenting on this rationale, the plurality declined to de-
cide the issue on the grounds that it was not concretely presented,
even if the factual allegations of the complaint were taken as true
and construed most expansively. 5 2 Apparently, the plurality
would have required that the dissident bar member allege explic-
itly the specific views that he held on particular matters on which
145. 367 U.S. at 879 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 882.
147. Id. at 884-85.
148. However, it must be noted the Court in Abood indicated that Lathrop lacked
precedential value on nonassociation rights. See 431 U.S. 209, 233 n.29 (1977).
149. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at 844.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 844-45 (citation omitted). Interestingly, there is serious doubt as to
whether this particular state interest is even legitimate under a rational basis
standard. See Comment, supra note 5, at 785 n.54, where the author argued
that such forced expression of views would clearly be unconstitutional under
the first amendment. Cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 241 (1977)
(compelling dissident employee to state specifically what his ideological be-
liefs are implicates first amendment rights).
152. 367 U.S. at 845.
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the bar had taken a position, and the degree and extent to which
his exacted funds were used to support those political activities. 5 3
Justices Harlan and Frankfurter believed that this constitu-
tional issue was inescapably before the Court and that it was "most
unfortunate that the right of the Wisconsin Integrated Bar to use,
in whole or in part, the dues of dissident members to carry on legis-
lative and other programs of law reforms... should be left in such
disquieting Constitutional uncertainty." 54 Justice Harlan charac-
terized Lathrop's arguments of first amendment infringement by
being forced to financially support political activities with which he
disagreed as bordering on the "chimerical."155 He found the state
interests supporting the integrated bar sufficient to outweigh any
incursions on first amendment freedoms.15 6 In fact, he stated that
there is nothing less than "a most substantial state interest in Wis-
consin having the views of the members of its Bar 'on measures
directly affecting the administration of justice and the practice of
law.' "157
Although Justices Black and Douglas clearly agreed with Jus-
tices Harlan and Frankfurter that the constitutional issue concern-
ing the use of compulsory fees for political activities repugnant to
the integrated bar member was before the Court, they could not
have disagreed more with the concurring Justices on the resolution
of that issue. Justice Douglas denounced the entire concept of the
integrated bar,158 and Justice Black rejected the balancing of inter-
est approach as applied by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and Jus-
tice Harlan.159 Noting that he could think of "few plainer, more
153. Id. at 846. These strict pleading requirements asserted in Justice Brennan's
opinion as the reasons for the failure of the plurality to reach the constitu-
tional free speech issue have been severely criticized as unreasonable and
inconsistent. It should be noted that the record in Lathrop was specific, or at
least as specific as the record in Street, where the issue was reached under the
Railway Labor Act. See Comment, supra note 5, at 786 & n.55; The Supreme
Cour, 1960 Term, supra note 5, at 135, 237-39. In addition, because the case
was brought before the Wisconsin Supreme Court on a demurrer and decided
on the merits by judicial notice, Lathrop never had the opportunity to present
evidence on bar activities and use of funds. The Supreme Court, 1960 Term,
supra note 5, at 136. It should also be noted that forcing the dissident member
to come forward and state what in particular he objects to and what his posi-
tion is on that matter seems to infringe upon first amendment rights. See
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 241, which may have tacitly overruled
this part of Lathrop.
154. 367 U.S. at 848 (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 852.
156. See Id. at 861.
157. Id. at 864. But see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
158. See Id. at 878-85 (Douglas, J., dissenting); supra notes 140-46 and accompany-
ing text.
159. Justice Black stated that the "'balancing' argument here is identical to that
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direct abridgments of the First Amendment than to compel persons
to support candidates, parties, ideologies, or causes that they are
against,"160 Justice Black reiterated his long standing absolutist
position on the first amendment.16' The Justice also made an ex-
tremely important analytical point when he stated that the fact that
the integrated bar provides many valuable services was irrelevant
as far as this constitutional question was concerned:
For a State can certainly insure that the members of its bar will provide
any useful and proper services it desires without creating an association
with power to compel members of the bar to pay money to support views to
which they are opposed or to fight views they favor. Thus, the power of a
bar association to advocate legislation at expense of those who oppose
such legislation is wholly separable from any legitimate function of an in-
voluntary bar association and, therefore, even for those who subscribe to
the balancing test, there is nothing to balance against this invasion of con-
stitutionally protected rights.
1 6 2
Because of the fragmentation of the Court in Lathrop, the deci-
sion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court was affirmed, and the issue of
whether an attorney may be constitutionally compelled "to contrib-
ute his financial support to political activities he opposes" was re-
served.163 Since four Justices did not reach this issue, three
Justices believed on the merits that an attorney could be com-
pelled, and two Justices asserted that such compulsion was uncon-
stitutional, Lathrop provided little guidance as to the issue. 164
After Lathrop, the commentators seemed to agree that it was an
issue that the Supreme Court would once again have to face. 65
Nevertheless, the Hanson, Street, and Lathrop opinions do sug-
gest some tentative conclusions relevant to the present controversy
concerning the integrated bar.166 (1) the issues of the constitution-
ality of the integrated bar and of labor union agreements creating a
union shop have been treated as analogous;167 (2) compelled
financial support of the integrated bar, like that of the labor union
which has recently produced a long line of liberty-shifting decisions in the
name of 'self-preservation."' Id. at 872 (Black, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 873.
161. Justice Black also made it clear that if he were to balance the competing inter-
ests involved, he would have no problem concluding that the first amendment
freedoms infringed by the integrated bar activities clearly outweighed any
state interest served by the integrated bar. Id. at 874.
162. Id. at 875.
163. Id. at 847-48 (Brennan, J., joined by Warren, C. J., Clark, J., & Stewart, J.).
164. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 233 n.29; T. EMERSON, THE SYS-
TEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 691 (1970); Comment, supra note 5, at 288.
165. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, supra note 5, at 136; Comment, supra
note 5, at 94; Comment, supra note 5, at 788; Recent Developments, supra note
5, at 549, 552.
166. For a discussion of Hanson, Street, and Lathrop from a slightly different per-
spective, see T. EMERSON, supra note 164, at 678-96.
167. See id. at 692-93.
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under a union shop agreement, does not per se violate the freedom
of association; (3) those attacking the activities of integrated bar
associations and labor unions under a union shop agreement on
first amendment grounds, as well as those Supreme Court Justices
reaching the merits on those issues, have only addressed activities
which would probably be considered political and ideological,168
e.g., campaigns for public office, lobbying, propaganda, legislation;
(4) in none of the cases did a majority of the Court explicitly re-
quire a compelling or substantial state interest to justify an in-
fringement on the first amendment rights; and (5) Lathrop did
leave a "cloud of partial unconstitutionality" floating over the inte-
grated bar.169
There is reason to believe, based on Street and Lathrop, that
given the proper pleadings and record a majority of the Court
would have found that compelled financial support of political and
ideological activities to which a member objected was unconstitu-
tional as an infringement of freedom of speech.?o Unfortunately,
from a certainty standpoint, the case which again raised this issue
did not involve the integrated bar but rather another type of labor
union agreement. Nevertheless, a substantial number of lawyers,
commentators, and courts171 believe that this case, Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education,172 answered the question reserved in Lathrop.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Abood-The Holding
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,173 public school teach-
168. See International Assoc. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 140, 169-70 (1961). But
see id. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting). However, it should be noted that in Lath-
rop there was some dispute during the oral argument on the case concerning
whether certain activities, e.g., lobbying on judicial salaries, were political.
See D. McKEAN, supra note 1, at 101-03. Justice Frankfurter indicated that
"[y]ou cannot rest this case on a nice line between what is political and what
is not political insofar as the bar as a corporate body in your state may express
its views." Id. at 103. Emerson argues that the distinction made between
political and non-political associational expression is inadequate and superfi-
cial. T. EMERSON, supra note 164, at 691-92.
169. 367 U.S. at 865 (Harlan, J. joined by Frankfurter, J., concurring).
170. See Comment, supra note 54, at 94-95. However, it should be noted that the
assurance with which this statement can be made today is somewhat dimin-
ished by the fact that only one Justice who decided Street and Lathrop, Jus-
tice Brennan, currently sits on the Supreme Court.
171. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
172. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
173. For a general discussion of Abood, see Gaebler, First Amendment Protection
Against Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REV.
995 (1982); Mitchell, Public Sector Union Security: The Impact of Abood, 29
LAB. LJ. 697 (1978); The Supreme Court; 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L REV. 188 (1977);
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ers challenged the constitutionality of a Michigan statute' 74 which
authorized a union and a government employer to agree to an
agency shop.175 Under the agreement, a nonunion employee would
be required to contribute to the union a fee equivalent to union
dues as a condition of employment. 176 Based on their freedom of
association, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the
agency shop agreement and statute were invalid. They alleged in
their complaint that they objected to public sector collective bar-
gaining in general and that the union:
is engaged 'in a number and variety of activities and programs which are
economic, political, professional, scientific and religious in nature of which
Plaintiffs do not approve, and in which they will have no voice, and which
are not and will not be collective bargaining activities, i.e., the negotiation
and administration of contracts .... 177
On appeal, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the
facial constitutional validity of a public sector agency shop statute
and agreement. Relying on Hanson and Street,17 8 the Court con-
cluded that although the compulsion of employees to financially
support the union has an impact upon first amendment interests,179
Comment, supra note 112, at 767; Note, Constitutional Limits on the Use of
Contributions Compelled under Agency Shop Agreements, 38 LA. I REv. 850
(1978); Note, Constitutional Right of Non-Association-Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 633 (1978).
174. McH. Comp. LAws § 423.211 (1970).
175. An agency shop requires the payment of a fixed monthly fee to the union as a
condition of employment regardless of whether the payer is a member of the
union in order to reimburse the union for costs of representation. A union
shop requires the employees to join the union as a condition of employment,
and a closed shop requires union membership as a precondition to employ-
ment. Mitchell, supra note 173, at 697 n.2.; Note, supra note 174, at 634 n.8.
Although the Supreme Court inAbood indicated that union shops and agency
shops are practical equivalents, it also stated that it was not addressing the
constitutionality of compelled membership. See 431 U.S. at 217 n.10.
176. 431 U.S. at 211.
177. Id. at 270.
178. The Court indicated that Hanson and Street recognized the following central
congressional interests that were served by exclusive union representation
agreements: avoidance of confusion in agreements, prevention of labor dis-
sention and conflict among unions, maximizing employee collectivization, and
the fair distribution of costs of representative activities among those who ben-
efit, i.e., eliminating "free-riders." 431 U.S. at 220-22. The Court summarized
these governmental interests as the "desirability of labor peace" and the elim-
ination of "free-riders." Id. at 224.
179. Id. at 222. The Court, after noting the many ways in which an employee might
disagree with union policies, objectives, and programs, stated:
To be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining
agent might well be thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with
an employee's freedom to associate for the advancement of ideas, or
to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit. But the judgment clearly made
in Hanson and Street is that such interference as it exists is constitu-
tionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important con-
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"[t]he same important government interests recognized in the
Hanson and Street cases presumptively support the impingement
upon associational freedom created by the agency shop here at is-
sue."180 Therefore, the Court concluded that to the extent the serv-
ice charge went toward collective bargaining, contract
administration, and grievance adjustment, the agency shop agree-
ment and statute were valid.18 1
After finding the agency shop agreement valid on its face, the
Court addressed the second issue presented by plaintiff's com-
plaint. Because the Michigan Court had ruled that state law au-
thorized the use of forced contributions to support activities other
than collective bargaining, the Supreme Court concluded that it
was faced with the constitutional issues not decided in Hanson,
Street or Lathrop --"the use of union-shop dues for political and
ideological purposes unrelated to collective bargaining."182 The
Court stated that earlier decisions183 clearly established a first
amendment freedom of association "for the purpose of advancing
beliefs and ideas .... "184 Moreover, the Court recognized the
existence of a right of nonassociation185 which would protect em-
tribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations
established by Congress.
Id. at 222 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the level
of governmental interest required under Abood to justify an associational in-
fringement, see infra section C-2.
180. 431 U.S. at 225.
181. Id. at 225-26. Plaintiffs had attempted to distinguish Hanson and Street from
Abood by arguing that in the government employment context in Abood col-
lective bargaining "itself is inherently 'political"' and compulsory financial
support of such activity would require "'ideological conformity ... ."' Id. at
226. In rejecting this argument, the Court admitted that there can be no ques-
tion that all public employee union activity may be termed political and that
protection of the discussion of governmental affairs was the central purpose of
the first amendment. However, the Court then stated:
But our cases have never suggested that expression about philosophi-
cal, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters-to take a
nonexhaustive list of labels-is not entitled to full First Amendment
protection.... Nothing in the First Amendment or our cases dis-
cussing its meaning makes the question whether the adjective 'polit-
ical' can properly be attached to those beliefs the critical
constitutional inquiry.
Id. at 231-32 (footnotes & citations omitted).
182. Id. at 232 & n.29.
183. E.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,357 (1976) (plurality opinion); NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
184. 431 U.S. at 233.
185. It should be noted that in Lathrop, the Supreme Court characterized the
plaintiffs first amendment challenge to being required financially to support
political causes which he opposed as being a free speech argument. See 367
U.S. at 844, 845 (plurality opinion). However, when the Supreme Court re-
ferred to the Lathrop opinion in Abood, it stated that this aspect of the case
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ployees from being required to support financially an ideological
cause they may oppose as a condition of public employment.186
Consequently, the Court concluded that a union could not, in the
face of employees' objections, use mandatory dues for ideological
activities not germane to collective bargaining.187
The Court did discuss another important principle during its
consideration of the appropriate remedies for the appellants in
Abood. Contrary to the plurality's position in Lathrop, 88 the Court
indicated that dissenting employees could obtain relief without in-
dicating the specific expenditures to which they object. All that
was necessary was an allegation that they oppose "ideological ex-
penditures of any sort that are unrelated to collective bargain-
ing."' 89 Otherwise, an unfair burden of proof would be placed on
the employee and, more importantly, "[t] o require greater specific-
ity would confront an individual employee with the dilemma of re-
linquishing either his right to withhold his support of ideological
causes to which he objects or his freedom to maintain his own be-
liefs without public disclosure."' 9o
B. Applicability of Abood to-the Integrated Bar
Many commentators and lawyers believe,' 9 ' and developing
case law strongly supports the conclusion, that Abood is substan-
tially determinative on the question of the constitutionality of the
use of an attorney's compulsory dues for causes to which that attor-
ney objects.192 Moreover, it can be solidly asserted that the rele-
involved an issue of freedom of association. 431 U.S. at 233 n.29. The signifi-
cance of this descriptive shift is not clear; however, it might be viewed as an
indication that since Lathrop the right of association and nonassociation has
broadened, developed, and assumed more importance within the first amend-
ment conceptual framework.
186. 431 U.S. at 235. The Court also stated in reference to the freedom of
nonassociation:
For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individ-
ual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's
beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than
coerced by the State.. . .And the freedom of belief is no incidental or
secondary aspect of the First Amendment's protections.
Id. at 234-35 (citations omitted).
187. Id. at 236.
188. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
189. 431 U.S. at 241.
190. Id. (footnotes omitted).
191. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 173, at 699. See also authorities cited in supra
notes 18 & 24.
192. See Arrow v. Dow, 636 F.2d 287, 288-89 (10th Cir. 1980) (relying in part on
Abood, court indicated that a complaint by bar association members alleging
that integrated bar used members' fees to engage in ideological activities to
which members object states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), on re-
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vant constitutional issues and elements arising out of the union
shop, agency shop, and integrated bar association cases are analyti-
cally analogous. 93 The essential question that was presented in all
the cases concerns the extent to which an individual's freedom not
to associate can be infringed by state action which results in that
individual being compelled, as a condition of employment, to con-
tribute to an association or group which uses those fees to conduct
activities to which that individual objects. 94
Admittedly, there are distinctions that can be drawn among the
cases which the Court has decided in this area, and among the or-
ganizations receiving the dues, 95 but the Court has made it rela-
tively clear that such distinctions lack constitutional significance
under a first amendment freedom of nonassociation analysis. For
example, some commentators have construed Abood narrowly to
address only the relationship between nonmembers and a union in
the agency shop situation.196 However, the Court, both before and
mand, 544 F. Supp. 458, 460-63 (D.N.M. 1982) (Abood controls and prohibits
use of bar fees, over members' objections, to support certain lobbying activi-
ties that do not serve important or compelling governmental interests);
Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 546 F. Supp. 1251, 1260-62
(D.P.R. 1982) (relying on Abood and Arrow, court held that challenge by bar
members to mandatory membership in bar association and use of fees to sup-
port ideological activities with which members disagree states civil rights
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), modified sub nom. In re Justices of
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1982) (issued mandamus
dismissing suit as to justices, but refused mandamus regarding defendant bar
association); Falk v. State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich. 63, 305 N.W.2d 201 (Mich.
1981) (petition challenging various activities of the state bar remanded for ad-
ditional findings; however, all justices appear to agree that Abood is of pri-
mary significance in resolving the issues, see id. at 84-119, 305 N.W.2d at 213-16
(Ryan, J., joined by Moody & Fitzgerald, J.J.), id. at 120-165, 305 N.W.2d at 227-
28 (Williams, J., joined by Coleman, C.J.), id. at 165-78, 305 N.W.2d at 241-42
(Levin, J., joined by Kavanaugh, J.)). Other decisions have clearly indicated
that Abood is not limited to the union context. See Galda v. Bloustein, 686
F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1982) (Abood applied to university students' challenge to use
of student fees for lobbying and research by nonpartisan, non-profit corpora-
tion); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Federal Election Comm'n, 678 F.2d
1092, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (Abood not applicable only to public em-
ployee unions). But see Palmer v. Jackson, 617 F.2d 424, 428-30 (5th Cir. 1980);
In re Discontinuation of State Bar, 93 Wis. 2d 385, 286 N.W.2d 601 (1980); Arm-
strong v. Board of Governers of State Bar, 80 Wis. 2d 746, 273 N.W.2d 356
(1979).
193. See, e.g., Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. at 460; Pike, supra note 7, at 8, col. 2;
Comment, supra note 5, at 788. One challenger to integrated bar activities has
been quoted as stating: "Conceptually, the state bar of Michigan is a union
shop." Pike, supra.
194. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 222-23, 232-35; Lathrop v. Dono-
hue, 367 U.S. at 827-28, 842-44, 845 (plurality opinion).
195. But see Comment, supra note 5, at 788 & n.69.
196. See Note, supra note 173, at 646.
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in Abood, consistently indicated that it was not so limiting the ap-
plicability of its doctrines. In Abood, the Court stated it was con-
fronting the constitutional issue not decided in Hanson, Street, or
Lathrop presented by the use of union-shop dues for political and
ideological purposes unrelated to collective bargaining.197 Further-
more, in Lathrop the plurality explicitly indicated that the inquiry
in the Hanson, Street, and Lathrop cases turned on the forced pay-
ment of fees, not on involuntary membership in an organization.198
The Court in Abood also seemingly rejected any differentiation
based on the government's direct or indirect involvement in the in-
fringement. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, quoted Jus-
tice Douglas' broad statement that he read the first amendment as
forbidding "any abridgment by government whether directly or in-
directly."' 99 Justice Powell, while rejecting the majority's broad
statement, did note a relevant distinction between government use
of a taxpayer's funds in ways with which the taxpayer disagrees
and a private association using compelled support for activities to
which the payer objects. He stated that "the reason for permitting
the Government to compel the payment of taxes and to spend
money on controversial projects is that the Government is repre-
sentative of the people. The same cannot be said of a union, which
is representative only of one segment of the population, with cer-
tain common interests. 200 Arguably, in this context an integrated
bar is much more like a union than a governmental body.
Although the answer to the question whether there will be a
wholesale extension of Abood's principles to the integrated bar as-
sociation necessarily will remain somewhat open until a challenge
to the integrated bar reaches the Supreme Court, a review of the
Court's opinions and recent lower court decisions provides little
reason to doubt that the issue left open in Lathrop and the issue
decided in Abood are conceptually identical. Nevertheless, the de-
termination that the principles of Abood apply to integrated bar as-
sociation activities does not provide an obvious answer to the
question reserved in Lathrop. Before this issue is discussed, how-
ever, the principles of Abood must be analyzed and clarified.
197. 431 U.S. at 232-33 & n.29 (emphasis added). See Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. at
461; cf. Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1048 (D.D.C. 1979) (refers to
Abood as part of the Hanson, Street, Lathrop line of cases addressing the
same constitutional issue).
198. 367 U.S. at 828 (plurality opinion).
199. 431 U.S. at 226 n.23. See also Note, supra note 173, at 853.
200. 431 U.S. 259 n.13 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). See also T. EMERSON, supra note 164, at 693-94.
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C. The Meaning of Abood
The task of applying the doctrines of Abood to the activities of
the integrated bar is made more formidable by the fact that the pre-
cise meaning of those doctrines is far from clear. In fact, one can
find surprisingly little agreement among commentators and courts
as to exactly what principles can be derived from the case. The
confusion predominantly stems from a certain amount of impreci-
sion and inconsistency in language usage throughout the opinion,
from the fact that the Court did not express itself in terms of
familiar first amendment standards 20' and did not indicate exactly
what type of analysis it was using,202 and from the fact that the
Court refused to draw the line between activities which were re-
lated to colletive bargaining and those which were not.2 03
1. The Holding
One troublesome problem arises out of the inconsistency with
which the Court expressed the issue and its conclusion concerning
union activities with which an individual disagrees. The issue was
stated, at various points, as being "the constitutionality of using
compulsory service charges to further 'political purposes' unrelated
to collecting bargaining,"204 "the constitutional issues presented by
the use of union-shop dues for political and ideological purposes
unrelated to collective bargaining,"205 and the constitutionality of
using "required service fees to contribute to political candidates
and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive
bargaining representative." 206
The Court's conclusion was expressed as being that first amend-
201. See 431 U.S. at 259-60 & n.14; Note, supra note 173, at 855. Justice Powell ar-
gued that the Court abandoned the established standards that apply when
something is entitled to full first amendment protection, i.e., strict scrutiny-
compelling or paramount state interest, and closely drawn means. See, e.g.,
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (plurality opinion). Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 64-65, 94 (1976).
202. Evidence of this is shown by the divergence in the opinions of commentators
as to what type of analysis the Court was applying. See, e.g., Gaebler, supra
note 173, at 1015 (not strict scrutiny); Note, supra note 18, at 744 (activities
must be germane to important state interest); Note, supra note 173, at 855
(balancing approach); Note, supra note 173, at 645 (balancing approach); The
Supreme Cour; 1976 Term, supra note 173, at 194, 196 (strict scrutiny); Com-
ment, supra note 112, at 782 (rational basis and strict scrutiny).
203. See 431 U.S. at 236. The Court indicated that because the case was before the
Court on the pleadings, it was appropriate to decide where this line should be
drawn. The case was remanded to the Michigan court to where "factual con-
creteness and adversary presentation" would aid in the linedrawing. Id.
204. 431 U.S. at 215.
205. Id. at 232.
206. Id. at 234.
1983]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ment principles prohibit required contributions "to the support of
an ideological cause [an employee] may oppose as a condition of
holding a job."207 In addition, the Court stated:
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the
expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward
the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as
collective-bargaining representative. Rather, the Constitution requires
only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or assess-
ments paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas and
who are not coerced into doing so by the threat of loss of governmental
employment.
There will, of course, be difficult problems in drawing lines between col-
lective-bargaining activities, for which contributions may be compelled,
and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining, for which such
compulsion is prohibited .... 208
It should be noted that the Court also, somewhat contradicto-
rily, stated that: "Nothing in the first Amendment or our cases dis-
cussing its meaning makes the question whether the adjective
'political' can properly be attached to those beliefs the critical con-
stitutional inquiry."209 Finally, the Court, in dealing with the facial
validity of compulsory service fees for agency shops, indicated that
"insofar as the service charge is used to finance expenditures by
the Union for the purposes of collective bargaining, contract admin-
istration, and grievance adjustment,"210 the impingement upon
freedom of association is justified.
The Court's ambiguous language has spawned divergent inter-
pretations concerning the union activities which would be constitu-
tionally prohibited under Abood upon objection by a dissenting
due-paying member.2 1 1 The narrowest interpretation of Abood is
that an employee cannot be forced to contribute to support union
political activities unrelated to collective bargaining which the em-
ployee finds repugnant.2 12 The fundamental flaw with this interpre-
tation is that the Court explicitly stated that the political nature of
the activity and the belief is not the "critical constitutional in-
quiry"2 13 and strongly indicated that it was not so limiting the activ-
ities which could be prohibited.214 This interpretation also would
require courts to engage in the almost impossible task of distin-
guishing not only between activities that are related and unrelated
to collective-bargaining but also between political and nonpolitical
207. Id. at 235.
208. Id. at 235-36 (footnotes omitted).
209. Id. at 232.
210. Id. at 225-26.
211. See generally commentators cited supra notes 112, 173.
212. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 173, at 707-09; Comment, supra note 112, at 775,
793; Note, supra note 173, at 642.
213. 431 U.S. at 231-32.
214. Id. at 234-36.
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activities. 215
Another plausible interpretation of Abood is that, at a mini-
mum, a dissenting union member can absolutely block contribu-
tions for political candidates and political views.216 Although
superficially this appears to be somewhat contradictory to the
Court's statement concerning the irrelevancy of the political nature
of the activity or belief, it is clear that the Court did not think that
contributions to political candidates or for the advancement of
purely political views were germane to a union's duties as collec-
tive-bargaining agent.217 The main problem raised by this interpre-
tation of Abood is the sticky question of what is a political view.218
The most frequent characterization of the Court's conclusion in
Abood is that a state may not, even indirectly, require an individual
to contribute to the support of ideological activities unrelated or not
germane to collective-bargaining. 219 Apparently, this principle re-
quires that two determinations be made-whether the activity is
ideological, and whether it is related to collective bargaining. How-
215. See Mitchell, supra note 173, at 708-09; Comment, supra note 112, at 793. These
commentators note the close relationship between political activities and the
objective of collective bargaining, particularly in the public sector. See also T.
-EMERSON, supra note 164, at 691-92.
216. A. KAurmAN, supra note 21, at 114.
217. See supra text accompanying note 208; International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740, 769-70 (1961).
218. Some commentators have argued that this is the central question that should
be asked. See Mitchell, supra note 173, at 708-09 (the relevant distinction need
only be made between partisan political activities and those of a collective
bargaining nature); Comment, supra note 112, at 788-794. This commentator
argues that the purpose of the right of nonassociation is really to protect soci-
ety's interests by preventing distortions of the political market place and,
therefore, the critical question is the political nature of the activity to which
the dissenter objects. Id. at 788. Under his analysis the distinction should be
made between activity that will cause ideological distortions, i.e., external par-
tisan political activity, and activity that does not have an ideological predispo-
sition. Id. at 789.
This distinction seems to be as hazy and fraught with difficulty as any
other. For example, is the use of compulsory bar association dues to lobby on
questions of judicial salaries an issue on which the bar association has an ide-
ological predisposition? See D. MCKEAN, supra note 1, at 101-04. In T. EMER-
SON, supra note 173, at 691-93, Emerson argues that the distinction between
political and non-political expenditures is superficial and ignores the fact that
associational freedom serves to protect the individual from forced expression.
Id. at 693. The individual's right to be free from forced belief seems to have
been the focal point of the Court's analysis inAbood. 431 U.S. at 434-35. More-
over, it should be noted that focusing on the political nature of the activity in
determining whether the dissenter can prohibit the use of his coerced fees for
that activity may obscure the central inquiry as to what the state interest is
that justifies any infringement on first amendment associational rights.
219. See 431 U.S. at 247, 254-55, (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J. & Blackmun, J.,
concurring); see also supra text accompanying notes 204-08.
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ever, there is good reason to believe that the "ideological" require-
ment is mere surplusage which crept into the Court's opinion
simply to make it clear that the first amendment associational
rights are not limited to the area of purely political beliefs. The ba-
sis for such a belief is that the term "ideological" is so nebulous and
broad that, absent a specific definition by the Court, the term is vir-
tually meaningless. 220
The Supreme Court in Abood must have implicitly recognized
this when it stated "our cases have never suggested that expression
about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical
matters-to take a nonexhaustive list of labels-is not entitled to
full First Amendment protection."221 The Court also stated that the
"freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing
beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and the Fourteenth
Amendments." 222 These passages demonstrate the extreme
breadth of the beliefs and activities that would be covered by the
Court's concept of "ideological." They also establish the principle
that the freedom of nonassociation protected by the first amend-
ment is affected by almost any coerced funding or activity that is
contrary to an individual's beliefs.223 Thus, the only determination
that really must be made under Abood in a union case is whether
the expenditure of compelled dues was made to support activities
not germane to or unrelated to collective-bargaining against the
employee's wishes; if so, compelling the expenditure violates the
first amendment freedom of association.22 4 This analysis is
220. Webster's defines ideological as (1) "of, relating to, or based on an ideology"
(2) "relating to or concerned with ideas." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY (1977). The relevant definition of ideology is probably "a
systematic scheme or coordinated body of ideas or concepts esp. about human
life or culture." Id.
221. 431 U.S. at 231. See id. at n.28 for a list of cases indicating that the first amend-
ment protects a broad variety of matters of opinion.
222. 431 U.S. at 233.
223. It should be noted that the appellants in A bood also challenged certain social
activities of the union; the Supreme Court did not reach this issue because of
lack of specificity in the record and the absence of adversary argument. Id. at
236 n.33. At least one commentator has interpreted Abood to include social
activities within its prohibition. See Note, supra note 173, at 642, 644.
224. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has left the definition and determination of
what is sufficiently "germane" or "related" to collective bargaining to lower
courts, and these courts have shown substantial variability as to the degree of
relationship that must exist between a union's activities and collective bar-
gaining. See Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d 1065,
1068-75 (9th Cir. 1982) (majority of panel broadly construed activities germane
to collective bargaining under Abood to mean activities which can be viewed
as supporting, promoting or maintaining union as efficient bargaining agent,
including union conventions, litigation on any subject matter, union publica-
tions, and social activities). But see id. at 1075, 1076 (Whelan, D.J., dissenting)
(Judge Whelan chastised the majority for reading "germane" too broadly and
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strongly supported by the lower federal court cases interpreting
Abood. These cases fail to make any mention of a requirement that
activities be found to be "ideological," focusing instead on whether
or not the activity is related to collective-bargaining.22 5
The broad principle from Abood, that the first amendment free-
dom of nonassociation is implicated whenever the state directly or
indirectly compels an individual to contribute financially to support
an activity he finds objectionable, would seem to have direct appli-
cability to challenges to integrated bar association activities and
would certainly seem to be an improvement over the constitutional
analysis that was available and applied a quarter of a century ago
in Lathrop.226 However, the principle from Abood that support
cannot be compelled for activities unrelated to collective-bargain-
ing lacks literal applicability to the question of which integrated
bar activities can be prohibited by dissident members, or more
broadly stated, is inapplicable to any context outside that of the
union shop or agency shop. What is essential in order for Abood to
have any further relevance to integrated bar challenges is a deter-
mination of the general first amendment standards and analytical
process the Court employed to reach its conclusion. This may well
be the most formidable obstacle to reliance on Abood in arguing
the potential unconstitutionality of certain integrated bar associa-
tion activities.
would have held that all the above activities were not closely related to the
particular collective bargaining agreement with the employer); Robinson v.
New Jersey, 547 F. Supp. 1297, 1316, 1323 (D.N.J. 1982) (Abood limits use of
compelled fees to lobbying activities that are designed to serve action re-
quired to implement a collective bargaining agreement and there must be a
direct relationship between activities and ongoing collective bargaining);
Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1048 (D.D.C. 1979) (expenditures must
be "essential to the collective bargaining process").
225. See, e.g., Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d 1065, 1072
(9th Cir. 1982); Havas v. Communications Workers of America (C.W.A.), 509 F.
Supp. 144, 149 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1048
(D.D.C. 1979); Beck v. C.W.A., 468 F. Supp. 93, 97 (D. Md. 1979); The Supreme
Court, 1976 Term, supra note 173, at 196. But see First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 818 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); Abood, 431 U.S. at 255
(Powell, J., concurring).
226. Lathrop only dealt with the issue of whetherfree speech rights were infringed
by the use of dues money for political activities to which the member ob-
jected. 367 U.S. at 844 (plurality opinion). It is also not clear from the plural-
ity's opinion in Lathrop whether the majority of the Justices in the Court
recognized that compelled support of even political activities had any impact
on first amendment rights. See id. at 845; id. at 848-61 (Harlan, J., joined by
Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Abood, 431 U.S. at 233 n.29; Comment,
supra note 112, at 776 n.65.
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2. Standards and Analysis Used by the Court
Perhaps the most perplexing element of the Court's opinion in
Abood is the absence of overt references to the traditional first
amendment standards and to the type of analysis in which the
Court was engaging. As a result, commentators and courts have
drawn divergent conclusions on these issues. The basic conclu-
sions are that: (1) the Court in Abood applied a broad balancing
test under which any legitimate governmental interest would be
sufficient to justify the impact on first amendment rights resulting
from compelled financial support of unions and their activities; 227
(2) the Court was actually applying a traditional first amendment
test under which the governmental infringement on first amend-
ment rights was subjected to the exacting scrutiny of the compel-
ling state interest standard;228 or (3) the Court employed a lower
level scrutiny requiring an important state interest and that activi-
ties for which support could be compelled be "germane" to that
interest.229
227. See 431 U.S. at 254-55 (Powell, J. joined by Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); Note, supra note 173, at 855-56; Note, supra note 173, at 845. One com-
mentator has taken the position that the Supreme Court applied a rational
basis standard from Hanson and Street to the determination of whether an
employee could be compelled to pay fees to the union under an agency shop
agreement, but that the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard requiring a
compelling state interest for compulsion of financial support for activities un-
related to collective bargaining. See Comment, supra note 112, at 778, 781-82.
But see The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 173, at 196, where the writer
stated: "Since these compelling government interests relate solely to the
union's duties as collective bargaining representative, the Majority was cor-
rect in holding that a state cannot authorize a union to expend dissenters'
funds for purposes unrelated to such activities." (Footnote omitted).
228. See, e.g., Galda v. Bloustein, 686 F.2d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 1982); Arrow v. Dow, 544
F. Supp. 458,463 (D.N.M. 1982); Havas v. C.W.A., 509 F. Supp. 144, 149 (N.D.N.Y.
1981); Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook Cty., 481 F. Supp. 1315, 1351 (N.D.
Ill. 1979); Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1048 (D.D.C. 1979); The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 173, at 190, 194, 196.
229. See Note, supra note 18, at 744, 746. Arguably, this overly literal interpretation
of A bood fails to adequately recognize and distinguish between four concepts
implicit in the Court's treatment of the issues: (1) the governmental interest
(e.g., labor peace), (2) the means to achieve that interest (e.g., collective bar-
gaining), (3) activities which can be considered to be collective-bargaining
(i.e., closely related or germane), and (4) separate activities which are not
collective-bargaining in nature. The "germane" test, if it is a test, only relates
to the question of whether or not an activity can be viewed as collective-bar-
gaining. See 431 U.S. at 225-26, 235-36.
One commentator, while not specifying the exact nature of the test used in
A bood, has asserted that the Court did not apply rigorous scrutiny because of
the implicit recognition that "the infringement on individual interests was not
very severe." Gaebler, supra note 173, at 1015, 1017-22. These contentions con-
cerning the magnitude of the infringement upon nonassociational rights re-
sulting from compelled support of ideological causes with which an individual
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Perhaps the strongest argument for concluding that the Court
was applying something akin to the rational basis standard under a
balancing test is the opinion by Justice Powell concurring in the
judgment. He stated that the Court had failed to apply the estab-
lished first amendment principles, which require exacting scrutiny
and a paramount government interest to support the infringement
of a first amendment right.230 The problem with such an argument
is that the majority and the concurring Justices did not meet head
to head on this issue. Justice Powell also thought that the reason
the strict scrutiny test should be zpplied in Abood, while not used
in Hanson and Street, was that Abood involved public-sector collec-
tive-bargaining, with a higher degree of government action.23 1 This
is the issue to which Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, re-
sponded, indicating that there was no difference in constitutional
scrutiny based on the directness or indirectness of governmental
action.232 However, the Court at no point in its decision directly
stated what that level of constitutional scrutiny was to be.233
disagrees appears to be substantially undermined by the majority's opinion in
Abood. See, e.g., 431 U.S. at 234-5 n.31, where the Court quotes Thomas Jeffer-
son to the effect that "'to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for
the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical."'
See also supra note 218.
230. 431 U.S. at 259-60 & n.14, 263 (Powell, J. joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun,
J., concurring).
231. See 431 U.S. at 254, passim; The Supreme Cour 1976 Term, supra note 173, at
191 n.21, 193, 195. Justice Powell also believed that the controversiality or
strength of a particular belief was relevant to the analysis of whether an im-
permissible infringement had occurred. 431 U.S. at 263 n.16.
232. See 431 U.S. at 226 n.23.
233. One explanation for the Court's failure to indicate directly the level of consti-
tutional scrutiny that was appropriate can be gleaned from an examination of
the context in which the case was presented to the Court. The issues were
before the Court on appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ant. With regard to the constitutionality of compelled support of an agency
shop the Court indicated that Hanson and Street were controlling and stated:
The same important government interest recognized in the Hanson
and Street cases presumptively support the impingement upon asso-
ciational freedom created by the agency shop here at issue. Thus, in-
sofar as the service charge is used to finance expenditures by the
Union for the purposes of collective bargaining, contract administra-
tion, and grievance adjustment, these two decisions of this Court ap-
pear to require validation of the agency-shop agreement before us.
431 U.S. at 225-26. Thus, it could be asserted that all the Court determined,
based on precedent rather than analysis, was that plaintiff had essentially
failed to state a cause of action and that the constitutional scrutiny or balanc-
ing on this issue had already taken place in prior decisions. See generally
Robinson v. New Jersey, 547 F. Supp. 1297, 1315 (D.N.J. 1982); Falk v. State Bar
of Michigan, 411 Mich. 63, 105 & n.20, 305 N.W.2d 201, 212 & n.20 (Mich. 1981)
(Ryan, J., joined by Moody and Fitzgerald, J.J.).
With regard to compelled support for activities other than collective bar-
gaining, the Court was still not required to engage in extensive analysis since
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Nevertheless, there is some indication that the Court was, in
fact, applying strict scrutiny, or at least scrutiny stricter than a ra-
tional basis test. First, while recognizing that the compelled pay-
ment of fees to support the union's collective-bargaining activity
interfered with first amendment rights, the Court indicated that the
Hanson and Street decisions recognized that such interference was
justified based on the "legislative assessment of the important con-
tribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations,"234 that
"the desirability of labor peace is no less important in the public
sector,"23 5 and that the "same important government interests rec-
ognized in the Hanson and Street cases presumptively support the
impingement upon associational freedoms.., here."23 6 Moreover,
the prior Court opinions on which the Abood Court relied to estab-
lish the relevant principles were cases in which the Court had ap-
plied a traditional first amendment analysis. The Court cited
Buckley v. Valeo237 to support its conclusion that the freedom to
contribute or not to contribute financially to a cause implicated
fundamental first amendment rights.238 However, Buckley is a case
which also stands for the proposition that the governmental inter-
est justifying an infringement on first amendment rights must be
"paramount" and "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridg-
it held only that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action under the first amend-
ment, and remanded for further proceedings. 431 U.S. at 237, 242. Arguably,
on remand for consideration of the issue of the use of compulsory fees for
purposes other than collective bargaining (and not related to collective bar-
gaining), traditional first amendment strict scrutiny would be expected to ap-
ply. See 411 Mich. at 105 n.20, 305 N.W.2d at 212 n.20 (Ryan, J., joined by Moody
and Fitzgerald, J.J.). See also Havas v. C.W.A., 509 F. Supp. 144, 149 (N.D.N.Y.
1981).
234. 431 U.S. at 222 (emphasis added).
235. Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 225 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the Court's opinions in
Hanson and Street render it virtually impossible to determine whether the
union shop was upheld against a first amendment attack because no first
amendment interests were involved, because there was a rational basis for the
infringement, or because the infringement on first amendment rights was
overridden by a compelling government interest. The Supreme Court, 1976
Term, supra note 173, at 190 n.17; see Railway v. Employees' Dep't. v. Hanson,
351 U.S. at 238; Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 249 n.3 (Powell, J.,
concurring); see also supra discussion in text at section U-B-l, 2. It should
also be noted that Justice Douglas, author of the Court's opinion in Hanson,
believed the Court had in that case found a compelling state interest in com-
pulsory financing of a union shop. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at 879
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
237. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Buckley involved a challenge to the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act limitations on the amount individuals could contribute to federal
election campaigns.
238. 431 U.S. at 234.
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ment."239 The Court also cited Elrod v. Burns24 0 for the proposition
that an individual's "beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his
conscience rather than coerced by the State."241 However, Elrod is
the case in which the Court stated that it "is firmly established that
a significant impairment of First Amendment rights must survive
exacting scrutiny," and reiterated the requirement that the state
interest offered must be paramount and narrowly drawn.242 Fi-
nally, the Court relied on Board of Education v. Barnette243 for the
proposition that the freedom of belief is not an "incidental or secon-
dary aspect of First Amendment protection."244 It must be
remembered that Barnette is the case in which the Supreme Court,
in striking down a compelled flag salute, also applied an exacting
level of scrutiny and required overriding state interests.2 45
Finally, regardless of what the commentators may have thought
the Court was doing analytically in Abood, recent federal court
opinions interpreting the case have concluded that the Court was
implicitly applying a traditional first amendment analysis. In
Galda v. Bloustein,246 a case in which state university students
challenged the use of their student fees to fund an independent stu-
dent political/educational research organization, the third circuit
concluded that the Supreme Court's opinion in Abood implicitly
recognized that governmental forced association cannot be justified
absent a compelling governmental interest.24 7 The Galda court in-
dicated that the Supreme Court in Abood had found that the na-
tional interest in labor peace was sufficiently compelling to justify
some intrusion on an individual's right of association and that the
collective bargaining process served that compelling interest.248
Similarly, in Arrow v. Dow,249 where lawyers challenged the use of
mandatory bar dues for lobbying activities by the bar association,
the court read A bood as standing for the principle that intrusions
239. 424 U.S. at 25, 94.
240. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Elrod involved a challenge by sheriff's department em-
ployees who claimed they were forced or threatened with termination if they
failed to affliate themselves with the current sheriffs political party.
241. 431 U.S. at 235.
242. 427 U.S. at 362-63 (plurality opinion).
243. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
244. 431 U.S. at 235.
245. See, e.g., 319 U.S. at 633, 639. The Court indicated that first amendment free-
doms cannot be impaired simply because there is a rational basis for the legis-
lative restriction. 'They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave
and immediate danger to the interests which the State may lawfully protect."
Id. at 639.
246. 686 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1982).
247. Id. at 164.
248. Id.
249. 544 F. Supp. 458 (D.N.M. 1982).
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on an individual's right of association could only be justified by im-
portant or compelling governmental interests. 250 The Arrow court
concluded that the governmental interest served by collective-bar-
gaining in Abood was industrial peace.25 1
In Havas v. Communication Workers of America,252 a case in
which nonunion employees alleged that their agency-shop fees
were being used for activities unrelated to collective-bargaining,
contract administration, and grievance adjustment, the federal dis-
trict court interpreted Abood as embodying the principle that the
government interest which will justify impairment of first amend-
ment freedoms of association must be paramount and of vital im-
portance.253 Similarly, the court in Gavett v. Alexander25 4 stated:
"Abood affirmed that government may require an individual to pay
dues or to make other contributions to a private organization, but it
limited that requirement to matters (such as stable labor relations)
which represent a compelling governmental interest."255 The court
also indicated that A bood stood for the proposition that the method
chosen to achieve the compelling governmental interest must be
central and essential to the achievement of that interest, i.e., it
must be the method least restrictive of first amendment freedoms,
and that only financial support for activities which were essential to
that least restrictive method could be compelled.25 6
Thus, it would seem that analysis and the weight of authority, at
least up to the present, suggest that the Supreme Court's treatment
in Abood of the question of impermiskible infringements upon the
right of nonassociation is consistent with traditional first amend-
ment techniques. The Court first found a compelling state interest
to justify the impairment of the employee's rights of nonassocia-
tion. Once the paramount interest (labor peace) and the narrowly
drawn means (collective-bargaining) which served that interest
were identified, it was logical for the Court to prohibit the coerced
use of the employees' dues for activities unrelated to that
250. Id. at 460-63.
251. Id. at 460.
252. 509 F. Supp. 144 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
253. Id. at 149.
254. 477 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1979).
255. Id. at 1048. Gavett involved an equal protection and first amendment chal-
lenge to a statutory provision under which surplus army rifles were sold at a
discount to individuals, who, inter alia, were members of the National Rifle
Association. The court held that this provision was unconstitutional because
it was not the means of achieving the governmental interest least restrictive of
first amendment freedoms.
256. 477 F. Supp. at 1047-49. Cf. Jensen v. Farrel Lines, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 335, 354
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (implies that Abood is based on strict scrutiny, i.e., compelling
state interest, least restrictive means test), rev'd in part on other grounds, 625
F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1980), af'd, 658 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1981).
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activity.25 7
D. Implications of Abood for the Integrated Bar
It is suggested that Abood establishes three general principles
that are relevant to the current constitutional controversy concern-
ing integrated bar association activities: First, there is a first
amendment right of nonassociation which is infringed by state ac-
tion which compels financial support of an association's ideological
activities that an individual finds repugnant. Second, in order tojustify that infringement of the individual's rights of nonassocia-
tion, there must be an important governmental interest served by
the activity for which support is compelled; support cannot be com-
pelled for activities which are unrelated to the essential or central
activity that serves the important governmental interest. Although
somewhat less certain, it appears that the governmental interest
must be paramount or compelling and that the means to serve that
interest must be closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment.
Third, to challenge expenditures on activities, an individual need
not specify the particular activity which he opposes. All that is re-
quired is that the individual indicate opposition to any ideological
cause, whatever that term may mean. Generally, regardless of the
level of governmental interest that is required to justify an associa-
tional infringement under A bood, the principle that compelled sup-
port of ideological activities implicates first amendment interests is
going to require courts to re-examine the question that has been
avoided since Lathrop, i.e., what are the state interests served by
the integrated bar association?
1. Facial Validity of the Integrated Bar
A preliminary point of speculation is whether the practical im-
pact of Abood is to overrule Lathrop as to the facial validity of com-
pelled financial support of the integrated bar. Although this has
been suggested by some commentators, 258 integrated bar oppo-
nents should probably not expect complete elimination of the inte-
grated bar association unless the courts apply a very rigorous level
of review. While it is not clear whether the Supreme Court in Lath-
rop recognized a freedom of association right that would be in-
fringed by compelled financial support,259 it is clear that the
257. See The Supreme Court 1976 Term, supra note 173, at 196. For additional dis-
cussion of how to distinguish between activities related to collective-bargain-
ing and those unrelated, see id. at 196-97. See generally, Merrill, Limitations
Upon the Use of Compulsory Union Dues, 42 S. Am L. & COM. 711, 747 (1976).
258. See Kurkland, The Future of the Organized Bar: All Bets Are Off, B. LEADER,
Nov.-Dec., 1978, at 1; Comment, supra note 15, at 287 n.144.
259. See supra notes 129-36, 228 and accompanying text.
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plurality found that there was a legitimate state interest served by
the integrated bar association-"elevating the educational and ethi-
cal standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the
legal services available to the people of the State. '260 Whether the
Lathrop Court would have also found that this was a compelling
state interest is uncertain.26 1
If Abood is interpreted to require only a legitimate state interest
to justify forced support of the integrated bar association, there is
very little question that the governmental interest in the quality of
legal services would supply that interest. All that would be left to a
challenger to the constitutionality of an integrated bar would be to
attack other asserted state interests and to argue that specific activ-
ities of the bar were unrelated to any of the legitimate state inter-
ests asserted. However, if a compelling or paramount
governmental interest is required to support infringement on asso-
ciational freedoms resulting from coerced membership in the inte-
grated bar, another line of constitutional attack may be available.
Assuming that a compelling state interest (e.g., quality of legal
services) exists, the question still remains as to whether the inte-
grated bar association can be considered to provide the most
closely drawn means to serve that compelling state interest.262 In
other words, is there any compelling state interest served by the
integrated bar association which could not be served through
means which impinge less on first amendment nonassociational
rights. 263
It is submitted that the effectiveness of the means employed to
achieve a governmental interest should be considered in determin-
ing whether a means is closely drawn. There have been very seri-
ous doubts as to whether the integrated bar is an effective method
of providing professional discipline and improving the competency
of the legal profession. Basically these criticisms stem from the
fact that, under integration, a self-interest group is being asked to
regulate itself. Commentators have asserted that the disciplinary
procedures of the self-regulatory bar are extremely inadequate.26
260. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at 843 (plurality opinion).
261. In this regard, Justice Douglas' dissent in Lathrop to the effect that the inte-
grated bar did not serve a compelling state interest, as he believed was re-
quired under the First Amendment, should be noted. See 367 U.S. at 879-85
(Douglas J., dissenting); supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
262. This is a different question than whether the specific activities, e.g., discipli-
nary, continuing education, and legislative programs, are sufficiently related
to the compelling state interest. It is also different from the question of
whether the particular state interest assertedly served by integrated bar as-
sociations is compelling. See infra text section Ill-D-2.
263. Cf. Gavett v. Alexander, 477 U.S. 1035, 1048 (D.D.C. 1980) (collective bargaining
was viewed as "sine qua non" of the compelling state interest in labor peace).
264. See, e.g., Gellhorn, Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 6, 24
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They also have argued that public (non-lawyer) participation in the
regulatory process is needed.2 65
In addition, the ability of the integrated bar association to effec-
tively improve the general quality of the legal profession through
advisory and legislative activities can be questioned on two
grounds. First, it could be argued that members of the integrated
bar association, because they are subject to the immediate control
of the court, would develop an obsequious attitude on issues of ju-
dicial reform and ethics.266 Second, and more importantly, the self-
interested nature of the bar association could substantially inter-
fere with its ability to engage in legislative activities which primar-
fly serve the purpose of improving competency and ethics. For
example, legislative activities involving minimum fee schedules,
unauthorized practice of law, bar admissions policies, and discipli-
nary rules are examples of matters clearly relating to the general
quality of the bar in which lawyer's self-interest could overshadow
the public interest.2 67 Arguably, alternatives more effective than
the integrated bar exist to perform these functions.
By pointing to the numerous states which do not have fully inte-
grated bar associations, 268 it could be argued that state regulation
and participation in voluntary associations would better serve, with
less first amendment infringement, every compelling interest
served by an integrated bar association.269 Nevertheless, unified
bar supporters, relying on the language in Lathrop that compelled
financial support of the integrated bar does not involve involuntary
membership in any other respect,2 70 might argue that compelled
payment to the integrated bar association and to a state regulatory
commission are indistinguishable. Arguably, however, this argu-
ment ignores the fact, recognized in Abood, that there is a right to
nonassociation which would be impaired by requiring support of
and identification with an association which conducts activities to
which an individual objects, even though the individual is not per-
sonally required to contribute financial support to those
(1976); Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is it Self-
Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 194, 203-04, 208-09, 235-36. These commenta-
tors note, inter alia, that there is no ongoing regulation of attorney perform-
ance or competence, disciplinary proceedings are defective, records are
seldom well kept, the process is controlled by members of the bar, the private
bar has failed to exercise its full supervisory powers, and the process is secret.
265. See, e.g., Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participation in Regulation of
the Legal Profession, 62 MimN. L. REv. 619, 641 (1978).
266. D. McKEAN, supra note 1, at 130-31; J. PAINEss, supra note 24, at 3.
267. See D. McKAuq supra note 1, at 60-69.
268. See supra note 1; J. PARNEss, supra note 24, at 3-4, Reynolds, supra, note 18, at
290-92.
269. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
270. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at 828 (plurality opinion).
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activities.271
Thus, as long as the integrated bar association remains an asso-
ciation in which members can voluntarily support ideological activ-
ities of the association, state regulation would be less restrictive
and, therefore, constitutionally preferable. The practical result of
such a situation may be the existence of integrated bar associations
which perform only educational, disciplinary, and client security
fund functions.272 Nevertheless, in the final analysis the success of
a renewed challenge to compulsory payment of dues to the inte-
grated bar as a condition of practicing law will depend on the de-
gree of scrutiny to which the courts subject the governmental
interests asserted to support the integrated bar and upon close fac-
tual determinations that are extremely difficult to predict. It can be
stated with some confidence that unless the courts interpret A bood
as recognizing that compelled membership in an association in-
fringes upon the right of nonassociation, and as requiring that even
if there are compelling state interests the means to achieve those
interests must not cause unnecessary abridgment of first amend-
ment rights, there is very little chance that Lathrop's conclusion
concerning the facial constitutionality of the integrated bar will be
disregarded.273
2. State Interests Served by the Integrated Bar
As commonly stated, the purposes of the integrated bar are:
to aid the courts in carrying on and improving the administration of justice;
to foster and maintain on the part of those engaged in the practice of law
high ideals of integrity, learning, competence and public service and high
standards of conduct; to safeguard the proper professional interests of the
members of the bar; to encourage the formation and activities of local bar
associations; to provide a forum for the discussion of subjects pertaining to
the practice of law, the science of jurisprudence and law reform, and the
relations of the bar to the public, and to publish information relating
thereto; to the end that the public responsibilities of the legal profession
may be more effectively discharged.
2 74
271. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 217 n.10, 222, 235.
272. See Mitchell, supra note 173, at 699; Pike, supra note 7, at 8, col. 2. South Caro-
lina, Virginia, and West Virginia currently have integrated bars which are lim-
ited to discipline and admission matters. J. PARNESS, supra note 24, at 4.
273. At least one challenge to the facial constitutionality of the integrated bar asso-
ciation appears to be pending in federal court. In Schneider v. Colegio de
Abogados de Puerto Rico, 546 F. Supp. 1251 (D.P.R. 1982), attorneys have chal-
lenged not only the use of mandatory bar fees for ideological purposes with
which they disagree, but also compelled membership in the bar organization.
See id. at 1260-61. The district court concluded that plaintiffs had stated a
cause of action and denied defendant bar association's motion to dismiss. Id.
at 1274-75.
274. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at 828-9 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). A
list of purposes of the integrated bar in Nebraska quite similar to this ad-
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As noted previously, the plurality in Lathrop distilled from these
purposes what it considered to be the state's legitimate interest-
"elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the
end of improving the quality of the legal services available to the
people of the State."2 75 Lower courts facing challenges to the inte-
grated bar prior to Abood found that there was a legitimate state
interest in the administration of justice and practice of law, which
was served by having the input of lawyers through bar legislative
activities in the public interest,276 and that the public interest in the
quality of the legal profession was served by integrated bar activi-
ties such as client security funds, fidelity bonds, and continuing le-
gal education programs. 277
Moreover, court decisions concerning the validity of certain bar
regulations in states that do not have an integrated bar tend to sup-
port the conclusion that registration and disciplinary regulation of
attorneys serve at least a legitimate state interest related to the
quality of the legal profession. Generally, these decisions have up-
held, against equal protection and due process attacks, registration
or licensing fees to fund disciplinary activities by the state govern-
ment.278 Mandatory payment to a client security fund has also
been upheld as a reasonable means to serve the state's legitimate
interest in maintaining the quality of the bar and thereby protect-
ing the public.27 9
It is suggested that many of the asserted purposes for the inte-
grated bar either fail to constitute a legitimate state interest, much
less a compelling state interest, or are interests which can be
served by means which produce less infringement of nonassocia-
tional rights. For example, safeguarding the professional interests
of the bar clearly does not seem to constitute a proper governmen-
tal interest.280 It would seem far too tangentially related to the pub-
lic interest to be considered even a legitimate state interest, much
less a compelling one. Instead, the primary beneficiary would seem
vanced in Wisconsin is set forth in In re Integration of the Bar, 133 Neb. 283,
291, 275 N.W. 265, 269 (1937).
275. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at 843 (plurality opinion).
276. See id. at 844; Armstrong v. Board of Governors of State Bar, 86 Wis. 2d 746,
752, 273 N.W.2d 356, 358 (1969).
277. In re Morris, 175 Mont. 456, 575 P.2d 37, 38 (1978).
278. See, e.g., Ables v. Fones, 587 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1978); Board of Overseers of Bar
v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998 (Me. 1980); In re Tennessee Bar Ass'n, 532 S.W.2d 224
(1975).
279. See Hagopian v. Justices of Supreme Judicial Ct., 429 F. Supp. 367 (D. Mass.
1977). A client security fund serves to reimburse clients for injuries resulting
from defalcations by attorneys.
280. The Internal Revenue Service would seem to agree with this assessment. In
1977, it indicated that "protection of the professional interests of its members"
does not serve a public purpose. Rev. Rul. 77-232, 1977-2 C.B. 71.
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to be the individual lawyer and the legal profession. It has been
noted that no other profession has a governmental organization
which has the power to lobby for the interests of the profession.28 1
Arguably, there is no reason why the legal profession should re-
ceive this special treatment. In fact, it is these self-serving pur-
poses and activities which have caused much of the criticism of the
unified bar.282
The interest of the public in knowing how the legal profession
views legislation affecting the administration of justice and the pro-
fession itself, asserted recently in Arrow v. Dow 283 as a general jus-
tification for the legislative activities of the integrated bar, is also of
questionable legitimacy. As has been noted previously 284 this in-
terest, if taken literally, would seem to violate independent first
amendment freedoms from forced expression of views and the
right to privacy of belief.285 This conclusion is clearly supported by
the statement from Abood that one has "freedom to maintain his
own beliefs without public disclosure." 286 Furthermore, if this in-
terest is viewed narrowly as being served by having only the views
of those lawyers who voluntarily express their opinions on these
matters, it could be forcefully argued that this would provide a dis-
torted picture of the profession's opinion,28 7 and that the goal could
be achieved by means that have far less impact on nonassocia-
tional rights of dissenting members, i.e., opinion polls by voluntary
bar associations.
Reading the state interest served by the integrated bar as aiding
and improving the administration of justice is problematic.288
While such a formulation of the state's interest might be consid-
ered adequate under a rational basis test, it is far too broad and
nebulous to be used in balancing state interests against individuals'
281. Katz, supra note 65, at 432, 433 (1977).
282. See supra notes 81-83, 88-90 and accompanying text; D. McKEAN, supra note 1,
at 60. One commentator has asserted that the solution to this problem is pub-
lic participation in the operation of the integrated bar rather than simply elim-
inating the bar's power to use governmental positions to engage in self-
interest lobbying. See Katz, supra note 65, at 433-34. See generally Gellhorn,
supra note 264. Gellhorn argues that occupational licensing in general (in-
cluding integrated bar associations) has the potential to be contrary to the
public interest and merely self-serving to the profession. See id. at 16-18, 21-25.
283. 544 F. Supp. 458, 461-62 (D.N.M. 1982).
284. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
285. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 241 & n.42; Comment, supra note
5, at 785 & n.54.
286. 431 U.S. at 241 (footnote omitted).
287. See Comment, supra note 5, at 789. It is argued that the group voice drowns
out the individual's voice, that the force and frequency of the group voice is
deceiving, and that other associations and individuals which are not the bene-
ficiaries of compelled support will be at a disadvantage.
288. See Note, supra note 18, at 749.
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first amendment associational rights under more exacting scru-
tiny.289 The court in Arrow v. Dow, in concluding that "advancing
the administration of justice or improving the legal system" were
not important or compelling governmental interests justifying lob-
bying activities as contemplated in Abood, stated:
The standard urged by the Bar is an all-encompassing exception to the rule
of Abood. It is difficult to conceive of an issue presented to the New Mex-
ico Legislature which cannot arguably be related to the administration of
justice or improvement of the legal system. The standard is too broad.
... .. The 'public interests' and the 'advancement of jurisprudence'
are not unitary concepts subject to a single interpretation. Disagree-
ments regarding legislative or other policy choices arise not only be-
cause they result in differing practical affects on individuals, but more
importantly because they reflect differing ideological approaches to
the subject matter. Such ideological beliefs, and association to pro-
mote or oppose such beliefs, lie at 'the core of those activities pro-
tected by the First Amendment.' Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)
(plurality opinion). '2 9 0
The purposes of the integrated bar most difficult to attack on the
basis of the principles expressed in Abood are interests related to
the quality, competency, and ethics of the legal profession. Admit-
tedly, these purposes could be considered paramount governmen-
tal interests. However, the difficulty with accepting these interests
as validly supporting the integrated bar on its face is that the inte-
grated bar is not a closely drawn means to serve these interests-
there may be other means to achieve these purposes more effec-
tively and with less impairment of first amendment rights. As has
been discussed above,291 state regulations of discipline and educa-
tion and voluntary participation in professional legal groups appear
to impinge far less on first amendment rights. Assuming that there
are paramount government interests which support compelled
financial contributions to the integrated bar and that the conclusion
in Lathrop that compelled membership in the bar for these pur-
poses is constitutional, unification opponents will have to focus
their efforts on challenging compelled financial support for particu-
lar bar association activities that do not adequately serve these gov-
ernmental interests.
289. See Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. at 462; Note, supra note 18, at 749. But see Falk
v. State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich. at 138, 305 N.W.2d at 228 (Williams, J.,
joined by Coleman, C.J.), where it is argued that the state does have a compel-
ling interest in using the state bar to "'aid in promoting improvement in the
administration of justice and advancement in jurisprudence.'" (citation
omitted).
290. 544 F. Supp. at 462 (quoting Falk v. State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich. 63, 116-17,
305 N.W.2d 201, 218 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., joined by Moody and Fitzgerald,
J. .).291. See supra notes 263-72 and accompanying text.
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3. Integrated Bar Activities
Any impact which Abood may have on integrated bar associa-
tion activities depends substantially on just what the "relatedness"
standard means, as well as on whether infringements on nonas-
sociational freedom are subjected to exacting scrutiny or some-
thing akin to a rational basis test. A difficulty in determining which
integrated bar activities are related or germane to the means neces-
sary to achieve the governmental interests and which are unrelated
ideological activities stems from the fact that the Supreme Court in
Abood was unable to, or chose not to, provide any guidance in
drawing the analogous line between "collective-bargaining activi-
ties . . .and ideological activities unrelated to collective-bargain-
ing."2 92 Neither the degree nor the kind of relation required is
indicated by the Court.293 A reasonable characterization of the di-
viding line is that the expenditures must be for activities that are
essential, not merely helpful, to the union's duties as bargaining
representative. 294 There is also some indication in the Court's opin-
ion that it did not consider expenditures on political candidates or
political views as being related to collective-bargaining.2 95 How-
ever, since there has never been an adequate delineation of what
constitutes a political view, this characterization only begs the ini-
tial question.
Under a traditional legitimate state interest standard, an activity
would only have to be rationally related to the governmental inter-
est being served.296 Thus, virtually any activity, no matter how ten-
uously related to the state interest, would be considered
acceptable.297 For example, nonassociational rights would have to
292. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 236.
293. See id. Note, supra note 173, at 857. In the context of Abood, one commentator
has suggested drawing the line between activities that are incident to the ne-
gotiation of one contract from those incident to negotiations of contracts in
general. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 173, at 197. See also
supra note 257.
294. See Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. at 1048; The Supreme Court, 1976 Term,
supra note 173, at 197. See also Robinson v. New Jersey, 547 F. Supp. 1297,
1316, 1323 (D.N.J. 1982) (Abood limits compelled financial support to activities
directly related to and required for collective bargaining). But see Ellis v.
Brotherhood Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d 1065, 1068-75 (9th Cir. 1982)
(broadly construes activities germane to collective bargaining as including ac-
tivities that can be seen "to promote, support or maintain the union as an ef-
fective collective bargaining agent .... Id. at 1074-75).
295. See 431 U.S. at 235; The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 173, at 196. But
see Note, supra note 173, at 857.
296. Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. at 1049; see Ohio Bureau of Employment
Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 489 (1977); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
297. See, e.g., Bridegroom v. State Bar, 27 Ariz. App. 47, 550 P.2d 1089 (1976) (up-
held expenditures in election campaign for a ballot proposition as being rea-
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yield where the means, certainly rationally related to the state in-
terest, are providing a forum for the discussion of legal reform and
the legal profession through the publication of a bar journal con-
taining advertisements, articles, commentaries, editorials, and bar
polls, or by holding an annual convention at which there are speak-
ers, discussion groups, advertisers, lobbyists, and free alcohol for
influential people.29 8 However, such a result renders meaningless
the Abood Court's distinction between activities for which support
can be compelled and those for which it cannot.299
Therefore, even under the legitimate interest test, the "related-
ness" standard should require a higher level of scrutiny of activi-
ties. In the example above, the question might be which specific
activities of the bar would be essential to the discussion of legal
reform in order to assure the competency of attorneys and which
activities could be called ideological and nonessential. Arguably,
under such an analysis many of the activities, (e.g., advertising, so-
cial activities, publication, or bar polls) would not be essential and,
therefore, could not be supported by dissident member's funds. It
must be noted that application of strict scrutiny would probably
lead to the conclusion that none of the activities, including provid-
ing a forum for the discussion of legal reform, would be drawn
closely enough to the paramount state interest of lawyer education,
discipline, and regulation to justify compelled financial support.
Because of the serious doubts as to the applicability of the ra-
tional basis test and a broad construction of the "relatedness" stan-
sonably related to improvement of the administration of justice); Button v.
Day, 204 Va. 547, 132 S.E.2d 292 (1963) (court upheld publication of bar news
bulletin); Axel v. State Bar of Wis., 21 Wis. 2d 661, 124 N.W.2d 671 (1963) (court
upheld publication of bar poll on judicial candidate's qualifications); Lathrop
v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404 (1960) (upheld publication of bar
bulletin).
298. See supra note 297. However, it should be noted that at least one branch of
the federal government appears to question the legitimacy of the governmen-
tal interest in providing a forum of discussion of legal reform and the legal
profession. The Internal Revenue Service indicated that admission, suspen-
sion, disbarment, and reprimand are public purposes served by the integrated
bar, but that "encouragement of stimulating discussion and protection of the
professional interest of members" are private purposes. Rev. Rul. 77-232, 1977-
2 C.B. 71.
299. The Supreme Court 1976 Term, supra note 173, at 197. See Ellis v. Brotherhood
Ry., Airlines & S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d 1065, 1076 (9th Cir. 1982) (Whelan, J., dis-
senting). The possibility of such a result strongly counsels the rejection of the
legitimate state interest standard as the one which the Court applied in
Abood. The majority's decision in Ellis exemplifies such a construction of the
related standard. By broadly construing the standard to include any activity
which promotes, supports or maintains the union as an effective bargaining
agent, the court upheld expenditures of compulsory dues on union social ac-
tivities, conventions, litigation, publications, insurance benefits, and organiz-
ing activities. See 685 F.2d at 1072-75.
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dard to situations involving infringements of first amendment
rights, the remainder of this article will discuss the impact of
Abood on the integrated bar association assuming application of
the paramount state interest analysis. For purposes of discussion,
assume that a court faced with a challenge to the activities of an
integrated bar association determines that the major governmental
interests served by the integrated bar are the compelling state in-
terests in maintaining and improving the quality of legal serv-
ices.300 This would be analogous to attaining labor peace and
eliminating freeriders in the Abood case.301 Assume further that
the means sine qua non for achieving these interests is determined
to be disciplinary rules and procedures, legal education programs,
and admissions controls. This assumption appears to be supporta-
ble in that these activities do seem to be central and essential to
achieving the governmental interests involved.302 Such activities
could be viewed as the equivalents of the core activities of collec-
tive-bargaining-contract administration and grievance adjust-
ment-in Abood. The ultimate task is to distinguish between
activities directly related to these central activities, for which sup-
port can be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to the
central activities, for which such compulsion is prohibited. Be-
cause of the close factual questions involved and the lack of guide-
lines in drawing the line, a clear-cut categorization of all integrated
bar activities is not possible. Instead, a brief review of some of the
major bar association activities will be undertaken.
Unquestionably, financial support could be compelled for activi-
ties that are directly disciplinary, educational, or regulatory in gen-
eral. Thus, funds to support a disciplinary counsel, client security
funds, and support for the basic staff of the bar 303 could be exacted
despite members' objections. On the other hand, it is equally clear,
based on Abood, that an attorney could prohibit the use of his
funds for the support of a candidate for public office. 304 Even if the
candidate clearly supported the bar's programs, support of a polit-
ical candidate probably could not be considered essential to educa-
tion, discipline, and admissions activities.
The more difficult questions arise concerning legislative, lobby-
ing, and publicity activities which are not so clearly political in the
partisan sense, but are unquestionably ideological. Examples of
activities in this area include bar polls, the publication of bar jour-
300. See Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. at 461-62.
301. See Mitchell, supra note 173, at 699-700.
302. See Gavett v. Mitchell, 477 F. Supp. at 1048.
303. See, e.g., NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASS'N, ANNUAL REPORT & DIRECTORY 313-17
(1982) [hereinafter cited as NSBA].
304. See supra notes 208, 216-18 and accompanying text.
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nals containing editorials, comments, and opinions on the law and
the legal profession, and the lobbying and study committee activi-
ties of integrated bar associations.
The lobbying and committee activities of the unified bar have
resulted in substantial controversy over the years, and distinguish-
ing between acceptable and unacceptable activities has proven ex-
tremely difficult.305 Integrated bar associations employ committees
to carry out most bar activities.306 Some of these committees en-
gage in strictly ministerial activities concerning the operation of the
bar association itself;307 other committees engage in the regulatory
work of the bar association.308 However, a substantial number of
committees are established for monitoring and disseminating infor-
mation and lobbying on certain legal issues both inside and outside
the bar.309 These committees present the greatest problem.
Much of the work of committees established for lobbying or in-
formational purposes is technical and related to legal procedure,
and certainly all of the work of such committees is related broadly
to the concept of improving the administration of justice. However,
some committees deal with areas of law that can only be described
as substantive, e.g., family law, mental health, criminal and correc-
tional law, and trust funds.310 Commentators have suggested draw-
ing a line between lobbying on those activities that are merely
technical and those which are more substantive.3 11 Commentators
have also suggested drawing a line between activities on which the
state bar would have an ideological position and those on which it
would be ideologically neutral.3 12 However, neither approach is re-
alistic because of the haziness of the distinction between what is
substantive and what is technical, and because it can be argued
that there is no such thing as an ideologically neutral subject, no
305. The Supreme Court Justices in Lathrop seemed to have a great deal of diffi-
culty with this distinction. See D. McKEAN, supra note 1, at 54-58, 102-03; see
generally id. at 52-83.
306. See, e.g., Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 246-50, 102 N.W.2d 404, 412-15;
NSBA, supra note 303, at 255-81.
307. Examples of these are budget committees and annual meeting committees.
See, e.g., NSBA, supra note 303, at 255.
308. Committees on ethics, unauthorized practice, client security funds, law
schools and legal education are examples. Id. at 260-68.
309. Committees on the administration of justice and legislation generally serve
almost exclusively as lobbyists for the purported position of the bar. See
Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d at 230, 238-39, 102 N.W.2d at 404, 409 (1960);
NSBA, supra note 303, at 257. In 1980 the Nebraska State Bar Association
listed expenditures of $37,054 on committee activities not related to discipline.
Id. at 313.
310. See generally NSBA, supra note 299, at 261-81.
311. See, Comment, supra note 113, at 789-90.
312. See id.
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matter how technical or related to the administration of law, disci-
pline, or education it may be.313
Because under strict scrutiny the question should be whether
the lobbying activities, no matter what the subject, are essential to
the core activities of education, discipline, and admissions pro-
grams, it could be argued that support could not even be compelled
for lobbying or legislative activities to propose a new disciplinary
code or establish educational standards. This is because such ac-
tivities are ideological activities that may not be essential to lawyer
discipline or education since the legislatures and courts have the
ability to obtain expert input from the legal profession through
other means (e.g., subpoena, voluntary appearances), 3 14 and the
ability to enforce discipline without bar lobbying. Thus, under
Abood, it is very possible that an integrated bar should be stripped
of the ability to exact support for any legislative activities.31 5
On the other hand, to the extent that the committees of the inte-
grated bar simply serve informational purposes such as the provi-
sion of educational materials on legal ethics or changes in the laws,
they should probably be viewed as being essential to discipline and
education and, therefore, not subject to withdrawal of support by
dissident members. Nevertheless, if the committee disseminating
certain proposed legislation asks for a response from the bar mem-
ber or if the activities which the committee undertakes relate pri-
marily to the economic self-interests of the member,3 16 the
committee's activities should be viewed as unrelated, that is,
nonessential, to the public interest served by education, discipline,
and admissions controls. 3 17 Consequently, compelled support
should be prohibited. Arguably, if these general guidelines were
applied to the standing committees of the Nebraska State Bar As-
sociation, at least twenty-six of the thirty-seven committees would
313. See Note, supra note 18, at 752; supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
314. See Note, supra note 18, at 752.
315. But see Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458, 461-62 (D.N.M. 1982), where the court
held that the state bar association could use mandatory dues to support those
lobbying activities which serve the important and compelling state interest of
improving the quality of legal services by raising educational and ethical stan-
dards. However, it should be noted that the court also held that compelled
support for other lobbying activities designed to inform the legislature of the
bar's views on legislation effecting the administration of justice and legal sys-
tem was not constitutionally permissible. Id.
316. An example of such suspect committee activity would be that of a lawyer re-
ferral service committee, an insurance committee whose primary responsibil-
ity is to find good group health insurance plans, or a committee to study the
economic conditions of lawyers in the state and make reports and give infor-
mation to members that will be beneficial to the membership. See, e.g.,
NSBA, supra note 303, at 259-61.
317. See Note, upra note 18, at 752-53.
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be suspect.318
The conclusion reached in reference to lobbying activities is
even more probable in reference to bar polls 3l 9 and bar publica-
tions. Bar polls and editorials, articles, and opinions in bar journals
would clearly qualify as ideological activities since they integrally
involve beliefs, opinions, and ideas. Moreover, these activities
would seem to be nonessential to the education, discipline, and reg-
ulation of the bar. The exception to this statement would be the
publication of information relating strictly to discipline, legal edu-
cation, or bar admissions, e.g., legal materials aimed primarily at
lawyers which reflect the current state of the law or expected devel-
opments. Thus, with the exception of support for the current-devel-
opment type of information, financial support should not be
exacted from bar members to support bar polls and bar
publications. 320
A question also arises as to whether financial support can be
compelled from lawyers for the support of integrated bar meeting
or convention activities. In 1980 the Nebraska State Bar Associa-
tion, for example, spent approximately $23,000 on meetings.32' Sev-
eral analytical turns must be negotiated before one can determine
if compulsory membership fees can be used to fund such activities.
First, it is necessary to separate out the components of state con-
ventions and to determine the nature of each component. Some ac-
tivities, e.g., speakers on a new disciplinary code or trust act, may
be ideological but would appear to be relatively essential to legal
education and disciplinary programs. Thus, to the extent the activ-
ity is characterized as strictly educational, the bar should be able to
compel support.
Other activities may be viewed as primarily social. Although the
Court in A bood avoided directly answering the question of whether
first amendment rights of nonassociation extend to social activities
to which a member objects, 322 it has been argued elsewhere that
the term ideological, as used by the Court, is sufficiently broad to
318. See generally NSBA, supra note 303, at 255-81.
319. Bar polls have been a particularly offensive and effective technique to bring
the influence of an ideologically motivated profession to bear on an issue. See
generally Goldstein, Bar Poll Ratings as the Leading Influence on a Non-par-
tisan Judicial Election, 63 JuD. 377 (1980). But see Axel. v. State Bar, 21 Wis.
2d 661, 124 N.W.2d 671 (1963).
320. It should be noted that the court in Arrow v. Dow did not reach the issue of
"the use of Bar funds for research on issues the Bar deems important or for
dissemination of the Bar's views on those issues in any manner other than
lobbying." 544 F. Supp. at 463.
321. See NSBA, supra 303, at 313.
322. See 431 U.S. at 236 n.33.
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include social activities.323 If this conclusion proves to be sound,
the issue becomes whether the particular social activity is suf-
ficiencly related to the educational, disciplinary, or admissions pro-
grams of the bar association. Golf tournaments and dances would
clearly seem to be nonessential, but it would be less clear, for ex-
ample, whether meals or drinks for an important speaker at a meet-
ing fall within the same category.
Such distinctions, and many others that must be drawn, indicate
the extent to which analysis based on Abood may vary substan-
tially from court to court.324 However, the preceding analysis does
suggest that applying Abood principles to the integrated bar activi-
ties will result in stripping the bar association of its ability to com-
pel support for many of its current activities. Strict observance of
nonassociation rights could allow dissident members to withhold
financial support for such bar association activities as lobbying on
any subject, any involvement with political issues as an association,
committee activities serving primarily the profession's interests,
and publication of bar journals as they are now constituted. Never-
theless, the integrated bar associations may be able to continue to
engage in some of these activities using funds voluntarily contrib-
uted to provide the necessary support.325
323. See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
324. The divergence of the interim opinions by the Michigan Supreme Court Jus-
tices in Falk v. State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich. 63, 305 N.W.2d 201 (Mich. 1981),
exemplifies the potential variability. Three justices would apply strict scru-
tiny to challenges to the integrated bar and would hold that the bar may only
use mandatory bar fees for regulatory or educational activities. Id. at 112-19,
305 N.W.2d at 216-19 (Ryan, J., joined by Moody and Fitzgerald, J.J.). This
would include continuing legal education, bar publications to the extent they
relate to informing members of current regulatory and ethical matters, the
client security fund, and public informational services to educate the public
about the use and availability of legal services. Id. at 114-16, 305 N.W.2d at 217.
These justices would prohibit the use of compulsory dues for any legislative
or lobbying activities and activities to further the commercial interests of law-
yers. Id. at 114-19, 305 N.W.2d at 217-19. Two justices would require a compel-
ling state interest and that bar activities be "germane" to those interests. Id.
at 134-38, 305 N.W.2d at 226-27 (Williams, J., joined by Coleman, C.J.). How-
ever, they would broadly define the state interest as improving the adminis-
tration of justice and would conclude that virtually all bar activities, including
lobbying and activities related to the profession's economic interests, are ger-
mane to that governmental interest. Id. at 138-65, 305 N.W.2d at 228-40. Two
justices declined to intimate their views as to the appropriate level of constitu-
tional scrutiny or the definition of the proper state interests served by the bar.
Instead, they believed that remand was necessary to develop the record more
fully concerning certain bar activities. Id. at 173-79, 305 N.W.2d at 246-47
(Levin, J., joined by Kavanaugh, J.).
325. The results of this analysis are quite similar to the results of a referendum
held by the District of Columbia bar association. See supra notes 11-12 and
accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Resistance to the integrated bar association has stemmed pri-
marily from three factors. First, being compelled to financially sup-
port and associate with an organization that conducts activities
with which one disagrees in order to practice one's profession is
inherently repugnant. This has been recognized since the time of
the Founding Fathers. James Madison noted: "Who does not see
... [t] hat the same authority which can force a citizen to contrib-
ute three pence only of his property for the support of any one es-
tablishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment
in all cases whatsoever."326 Similarly, Thomas Jefferson stated:
"[t] o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the prop-
agation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyranni-
cal."327 Second, there is an inherent financial self-interest that
causes individuals to rebel against supporting activities when the
financial cost becomes excessive in comparison to the value of the
activity to the individual. Finally, there have been recurring doubts
concerning the efficacy of the integrated bar association in serving
the public interest.
Although those opposing the integrated bar association have
met with little success in the past, there is substantial reason to
believe that the days of the integrated bar association, as it has op-
erated for the last sixty years, are numbered. In addition to mount-
ing anti-integration sentiment from both inside and outside the bar,
there have been important legal developments since Lathrop v.
Donohue. These developments cast doubt on the continuing con-
stitutionality of most integrated bar association activities. Proba-
bly the most important development was the Court's decision in
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.
Abood gave legal recognition to the repugnance of forced
financial association by establishing the basic principle that there
is a first amendment freedom of nonassociation that is impaired by
compelled financial support of an association which carries on ac-
tivities with which one disagrees. Equally important is the fact that
Abood, by recognizing this first amendment principle, implicitly
provides a legal standard under which the activities and efficacy of
the integrated bar can be examined. Thus, it gives integrated bar
opponents more than just the right to petition the state courts and
legislatures in order to challenge the integrated bar.
Obviously, many questions concerning the constitutionality of
326. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 234-35 n.31 (citing 2 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 186 (Hunt ed. 1901)).
327. 431 U.S. at 234 n.31 (citing I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON, THE NATIONALIST 354
(1948)).
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the integrated bar association and its activities remain after A bood,
and perhaps the answers to some of these questions will have to
wait until a constitutional challenge to the integrated bar reaches
the Supreme Court. Furthermore, it is recognized that many of the
conclusions reached herein are unavoidably speculative due to the
close factual nature of many of the determinations to be made
under Abood and to a certain amount of ambiguity in the Abood
opinion. Nevertheless, analysis indicates that Abood and its few
progeny clearly portend change for integrated bar associations.
It is submitted that Abood recognizes the general principles that
financial support and membership in an association cannot be com-
pelled by the state as a condition of employment except to serve a
paramount state interest, that the core means to serve that state
interest must be the least restrictive of the freedom of non-associa-
tion, and that all association activities for which financial support
can be compelled must be essential or directly related to those core
means. Strict application of these principles to the integrated bar
association suggests that the facial constitutionality of the inte-
grated bar supposedly established by Lathrop is doubtful. This is
because the state interests served by the fully integrated bar asso-
ciation could be served more effectively by alternative means that
infringe less on first amendment rights.
However, even if the effect of Abood is not to cast doubt upon
Lathrop as to this issue, the ultimate effect of a challenge based on
Abood to integrated bar activities should be the same-elimina-
tion, for all practical purposes, of the integrated bar. The reason for
this conclusion is that once the purposes and objectives of the inte-
grated bar association are subjected to exacting scrutiny, the only
paramount state interests found to be served by the integrated bar
would be maintaining the quality, competency, and ethics of the
legal profession. These interests would only be served by activities
which are essential to disciplinary, educational, and admissions
programs, the central means to achieve the governmental interests.
Because monetary support could only be compelled for these activ-
ities, the other activities of the integrated bar would have to depend
on voluntary contribution.
In light of the resurgence of anti-bar unification sentiment,328
the integrated bar associations should not be too optimistic about
the number of contributions that will come rolling in, especially
since the voluntary contributions to integrated bar activities may
328. For example, a referendum conducted in 1979 in Wisconsin indicated that of
9,139 lawyers, 2,820 answering a poll were against continuation of the inte-
grated bar and only 1,892 were in favor of continuing integration. In re Discon-
tinuation of State Bar, 93 Wis. 2d 385, 386, 286 N.W.2d 601, 602 (1980).
[Vol. 63:30
THE INTEGRATED BAR
not even be tax deductible.329 As a result of the decrease in bar
revenues to support activities like lobbying, public relations, and
activities serving primarily the interests of the profession, the asso-
ciation will not be able to conduct many of these activities at all.
When it is remembered that the primary motivation behind the bar
integration movement in the first place was to serve the interests of
the legal profession,330 it could be expected that, when effectively
shorn of that ability, many integrated bar associations will disap-
pear or exist in name only. On the other hand, keeping this self-
interest motivation of the bar in mind, it might be expected that the
self-governing integrated bar would continue to exist in those juris-
dictions where lawyer discipline has not been taken out of the
hands of the bar or opened to public participation. This self-protec-
tionism 331 is just one more reason to conclude that the integrated
bar association cannot possibly serve any paramount public
interest.
As Justice Douglas stated in Lathrop, "the necessities of life put
us into relations with others that may be undesirable or even ab-
horrent, if individual standards were to obtain. Yet if this right is to
be curtailed by law, if the individual is to be compelled to associate
with others in a common cause, then I think exceptional circum-
stances should be shown."332
329. Rev. Rul. 77-232, 1977-2 C.B. 71.
330. See supra notes 26-29, 49-60, 63 and accompanying text.
331. A comment by DeTocqueville seems relevant here: 'The lawyers do not, in-
deed, wish to overthrow the institutions of democracy, but they constantly en-
deavor to turn it away from its real direction by means that are foreign to its
nature." A. DEToCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835) (quoted in D. Mc-
KEAN, supra note 1, at 134).
332. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at 882 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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